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Abstract
From a little-known, foreign concept to a critical component of the country’s increasingly
multi-layered capital markets, private equity in China has undergone tremendous development in
the past decade. This Note first reviews the representative deals of major U.S. private equity firms
(Bain Capital, Blackstone, Carlyle, KKR, TPG, Warburg Pincus, and the private equity arms of
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley) in China, and profiles leading Chinese private equity firms
and their relationship with the U.S. firms. Then, the Note analyzes the evolving web of laws
that regulates China’s private equity industry, with special attention to the rise of RMB funds,
and recent legal developments such as the Foreign-Invested Partnership (“FIP”) regulation and
the Qualified Foreign Limited Partners (“QFLP”) program that many believe will lead to a level
playing field for foreign and domestic firms. The thesis of this study is two-fold. First, the devel-
opment of a legal framework for private equity in China is closely tied to the country’s economic
fundamentals. To date, private equity boomed in China largely in response to the unmet financial
needs of small and medium-sized private companies and a financial system overly reliant on state-
owned banks; going forward, the prosperity of foreign private equity firms in China will hinge on
the country’s gradual relaxation of its foreign exchange control and its plans for the renminbi to
become a global currency. Second, private equity offers a unique lens for understanding China’s
legal system. In particular, this study examines the advantages and potential pitfalls of China’s
administrative rulemaking process, and the important yet controversial role of the government in
a historic economic transformation.
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ABSTRACT 
From a little-known, foreign concept to a critical component of the 
country’s increasingly multi-layered capital markets, private equity 
in China has undergone tremendous development in the past decade.  
This Note first reviews the representative deals of major U.S. private 
equity firms (Bain Capital, Blackstone, Carlyle, KKR, TPG, 
Warburg Pincus, and the private equity arms of Goldman Sachs and 
Morgan Stanley) in China, and profiles leading Chinese private 
equity firms and their relationship with the U.S. firms.  Then, the 
Note analyzes the evolving web of laws that regulates China’s 
private equity industry, with special attention to the rise of RMB 
funds, and recent legal developments such as the Foreign-Invested 
Partnership (“FIP”) regulation and the Qualified Foreign Limited 
Partners (“QFLP”) program that many believe will lead to a level 
playing field for foreign and domestic firms.  The thesis of this study 
is two-fold.  First, the development of a legal framework for private 
equity in China is closely tied to the country’s economic 
fundamentals.  To date, private equity boomed in China largely in 
response to the unmet financial needs of small and medium-sized 
private companies and a financial system overly reliant on state-
owned banks; going forward, the prosperity of foreign private equity 
firms in China will hinge on the country’s gradual relaxation of its 
foreign exchange control and its plans for the renminbi to become a 
global currency.  Second, private equity offers a unique lens for 
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understanding China’s legal system.  In particular, this study 
examines the advantages and potential pitfalls of China’s 
administrative rulemaking process, and the important yet 
controversial role of the government in a historic economic 
transformation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
2010 was a banner year for China’s private equity industry.  A mere 
decade ago, private equity was little known in China, and fund-raising 
was trivial.  The industry saw meteoric growth through the decade, first 
led by American and other foreign private equity firms, with domestic 
firms entering the scene in late 2006 and rapidly catching up.  From 
2003 to 2010, the compound annual growth of China’s private equity 
industry was 40%.1  2010 saw eighty-two new China-focused private 
equity funds that raised a total of $27.6 billion, and 363 new investments 
in the total amount of $10.3 billion.2  In a series of new regulations and 
decisions, Chinese government at the national, provincial and municipal 
levels sent strong signals encouraging the country’s private equity 
industry. 
American private equity firms are pioneers and industry leaders in 
the world.  Major American private equity firms, such as Bain Capital, 
Blackstone, Carlyle, KKR, TPG and Warburg Pincus set foot in China at 
the dawn of this century, when China was just entering the World Trade 
Organization, and when the Chinese regulatory regime was still largely 
underdeveloped.  These players brought fresh and bold ideas into the 
fledging and tightly controlled capital markets in China.3  Along with 
other types of financial institutions, such as investment banks, they 
spurred an array of broad-based legislation and rulemaking processes.  A 
mere ten years later, these private equity firms find themselves in an 
 
 1. Lefei Liu, President, Beijing Private Equity Association (“BPEA”), Keynote 
Address at the 2010 Global Private Equity Beijing Forum: Bentu Jijin Jiang Zhudao 
Zhongguo PE Shichang [Domestic Funds Will Lead China’s Private Equity Market] 
(Nov. 14, 2010), http://www.pedaily.cn/Item/200447.aspx. 
 2. ZERO2IPO RESEARCH CENTER, 2010 STATISTICS FOR THE VENTURE CAPITAL 
AND PRIVATE EQUITY MARKETS IN CHINA 13, 16 (2010). 
 3. See, e.g., Frederik Balfour & Xiang Ji, Private Equity in China Comes of Age, 
BUS. WK., July 24, 2007, available at http://www.businessweek.com/ 
globalbiz/content/jul2007/gb20070724_300288.htm; Shaun Rein, China’s Private 
Equity Boom, BUS. WK., July 16, 2008, available at http://www.businessweek.com/ 
globalbiz/content/jul2008/gb20080716_744989.htm; Ellen Sheng, The Go-Go World of 
Private Equity in China, WALL ST. J. DEAL J. (Aug. 30, 2010, 2:07 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2010/08/30/the-go-go-world-of-private-equity-in-china/; 
Private Equity in China: Barbarians in Love, ECONOMIST, Nov. 27, 2010, at 35. 
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increasingly intricate web of laws and regulations.4 
American firms’ overseas expansion tracks the recent private equity 
boom at home, roughly from 2002 to 2007.5  During this period, the 
amounts invested in private equity increased substantially.  However, in 
mid-2007, the credit crisis that started earlier in the mortgage markets 
spilled over to the junk bond and leveraged loan markets, and as a result, 
the entire leveraged finance market came to an abrupt halt.6  As the 
markets at home recover gradually, major U.S. private equity funds have 
been proactively seeking to expand their foothold in China through ever-
larger deals.7 
Take a recent successful exit by TPG, a leading U.S. private equity 
firm, as an example.  In June 2009, TPG sold its entire 17% stake in the 
Shenzhen Development Bank to Ping An Insurance8 for about $2.28 
billion, following a $150 million investment in the bank in 2004.  The 
deal was recognized by the Dow Jones Private Equity Analyst as one of 
the “Top 5 Buyout-Backed Exits Via M&A” in 2009,9 and is noteworthy 
in several ways.  First, the 2004 TPG-Newbridge10 investment in the 
Shenzhen Development Bank, after a two-year negotiation process, 
marked the first and only time that a Chinese national bank11 became 
 
 4. See infra Parts IV, V, and VI. 
 5. See Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas, Does Private Equity Create 
Wealth?  The Effects of Private Equity and Derivatives on Corporate Governance, 76 
U. CHI. L. REV. 219, 225 (2009). 
 6. DAVID P. STOWELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO INVESTMENT BANKS, HEDGE FUNDS, 
AND PRIVATE EQUITY 291-92 (Academic Press 2010). 
 7. See Private Equity in China: Barbarians in Love, supra note 3, at 1. 
 8. Founded in 1988 and headquartered in Shenzhen, China.  The Chairman of 
Ping An Insurance is Ma Mingzhe, a one-time chauffeur, self-made man and an avid 
advocate for diversified financial conglomerates in China.  Ping An is currently China’s 
second largest insurer, after China Life Insurance Co.  See Rick Carew, TPG Nears Sale 
of Stake in China Bank, WALL ST. J., June 9, 2009, at C2. 
 9. DOW JONES PRIVATE EQUITY ANALYST, 2009 REVIEW & 2010 OUTLOOK 30 
(2010).  The deal was the only one from “emerging markets” listed among the twenty 
“Deals of the Year.” 
 10. Newbridge was TPG’s Asia investment arm at the time.  See Carew, supra note 
8, at C2. 
 11. Shenzhen Development Bank is one of the seventeen “joint-stock” Chinese 
banks that operate on national license, aside from the “big four” state-owned banks.  As 
of the writing of this note, TPG remains the only foreign buyout firm to have gained 
approval from China’s government to invest in a Chinese bank.  In 2007, the China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (“CBRC”) rejected Carlyle’s bid to buy part of 
Chongqing City Commercial Bank.  See Zijing Wu & Fox Hu, TPG’s Newbridge 
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controlled by a foreign financial institution.12  Second, the chief 
negotiator for TPG went on in December 2006 to create Bohai Fund,13 
the first Chinese private equity fund denominated in renminbi 
(“RMB”).14  Third, the acquirer, Ping An Insurance, is itself a 
beneficiary of foreign investments, notably by Goldman Sachs and 
Morgan Stanley in 1994, and by HSBC in 2002.15  Fourth, despite 
spectacular return on this investment, TPG has reportedly had 
difficulties navigating the regulatory framework in China.16 
An American private equity professional in the China market 
should not be surprised by these characteristics.  Despite seemingly 
abundant opportunities to make money, the market is now seeing more 
and more highly competitive local firms, often spearheaded by people 
formerly trained in American institutions.  More importantly, laws and 
regulations are developing very rapidly.  This Note addresses these 
concerns by outlining the legal environment for foreign private equity 
funds in China, analyzing specific topics of interest, and discussing 
 
Raises $1.2 Billion in Ping An Stock Offering, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 3, 2010, 5:14 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-02/tpg-s-newbridge-seeking-1-16-billion-in-
sale-of-ping-an-insurance-shares.html.  The investment by a foreign financial institution 
in a Chinese bank is governed by the Jingwai Jinrong Jigou Touzi Rugu Zhongzi 
Jinrong Jigou Guanli Banfa [Administrative Measures of the Investment and 
Shareholding in Chinese-funded Financial Institutions by Foreign Financial Institutions] 
(promulgated by the China Banking Reg. Comm’n, Dec. 8, 2003, effective Dec. 31, 
2003). 
 12. TPG assuaged China’s banking regulators with an agreement for a five-year 
lockup on the stake.  TPG furthered its control by appointing a former U.S. Treasury 
deputy secretary and CFO for Bank of America, Frank Newman, as chairman of the 
bank and has worked since the 2004 purchase to stack the bank’s board with allies.  See 
Brian Bremner, The Great Bank Overhaul, BUS. WK., Aug. 22, 2005, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_34/b3948466.htm. 
 13. Luo Yan, Ou Wei Shi Shei [Who Is Ou Wei], HUANQIU QIYEJIA [GLOBAL 
ENTREPRENEUR], Dec. 20, 2007, available at www.gemag.com.cn/gemag/new/ 
Picnew_content.asp?C_id=823.  See also infra note 71 for a recent “exodus” of Chinese 
talents from Western to China-based private equity firms. 
 14. Renminbi (literally “people’s currency”) is the official currency in the People’s 
Republic of China (“PRC”).  The primary unit of renminbi is yuan. 
 15. Press Release, Ping An, HSBC to Increase Stake in Ping An by Acquisition of 
Shares from Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley (Apr. 9, 2005), 
http://www.pingan.com/about/en/news_70052.jsp. 
 16. See Daniel Inman, Ping An to Invest in Shenzhen Development Bank, BUS. 
WK., June 14, 2009, available at http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/ 
content/jun2009/gb20090614_511195.htm. 
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potential legal developments and policy directions. 
Part I paints the legal and business landscapes of private equity in 
the United States.  Part II reviews representative investments of major 
U.S. private equity firms in China.  Part III profiles leading Chinese 
private equity firms and their relationship with their U.S. counterparts.  
Part IV gives a general introduction to Chinese law, and analyzes the 
evolving web of laws of which a foreign private equity firm in China 
should be cognizant.  Part V examines the Foreign-Invested Partnership 
(“FIP”) regulation that came into effect in early 2010, and the race to set 
up RMB funds among foreign private equity funds.  Part VI discusses 
the latest legal developments, including the Qualified Foreign Limited 
Partners (“QFLP”) scheme and the Shanghai pilot program.  The last 
part is the Conclusion. 
 
I. BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: PRIVATE EQUITY IN THE UNITED STATES 
The contours of private equity can be a little amorphous.17  Some 
commentators view private equity as an asset class consisting of pools of 
actively managed capital organized to invest in privately held and 
certain public companies and securities.18  Others have defined it based 
on different forms of investment strategies: leveraged buyout, growth 
capital, mezzanine capital, and venture capital.19  This well accepted 
categorization, however, should be viewed with two caveats: first, for 
historical reasons (for instance, KKR’s landmark buyout of RJR Nabisco 
in the late 1980s),20 many people still see buyout funds as synonymous 
with private equity; second, venture capital is often treated as distinct 
from private equity because of its particular focus on early-stage, high-
potential startup companies. 
 
 
 
 17. See Lloyd L. Drury, III, Private Equity and The Heightened Fiduciary Duty of 
Disclosure, 6 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 33, 39 (2009). 
 18. MERRILL LYNCH ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS, PRIVATE EQUITY PRIMER 8 
(2010). 
 19. STOWELL, supra note 6, at 283. 
 20. See generally GEORGE P. BAKER & GEORGE DAVID SMITH, THE NEW 
FINANCIAL CAPITALISTS: KKR AND THE CREATION OF CORPORATE VALUE (Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1998); BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: 
THE FALL OF RJR NABISCO (Harper & Row 1990). 
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Figure 1 
The Private Equity Spectrum 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 Source: MERRILL LYNCH ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS, PRIVATE EQUITY  
          PRIMER 8 (2010). 
 
Private equity funds are typically structured as pass-through 
entities, i.e. limited partnerships and limited liability companies that are 
transparent for tax purposes.  Private equity funds typically raise money 
through private placements made pursuant to Regulation D (“Reg D,” 
for accredited investors) or Regulation S (“Reg S,” for non-U.S. 
investors) of the Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”).  The 1933 Act 
requires that every offer and sale of securities be registered with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) through the filing of a 
Registration Statement, including a disclosure document, known as a 
Prospectus, unless some exemption from registration is available under 
applicable law.21  Reg D provides three exemptions: Rules 504 and 505 
were promulgated on the basis of Section 3(b) of the 1933 Act, which 
authorizes the SEC to develop exemptions for offerings up to $5 million 
in amount when registration is not necessary to protect the public 
interest or investors; Rule 506, on the other hand, represents a 
nonexclusive safe harbor for the private offering exemption of Section 
4(2).22  Reg S provides safe harbors for off-shore distributions and resale 
of unregistered securities of U.S. and foreign issuers, when (1) offers are 
not made to persons in the United States; (2) the buyer is outside the 
United States or the seller reasonably believes him to be; (3) no direct 
selling effort is made in the United States; (4) the buyer is advised that 
interests may not be offered or sold in the United States or to U.S. 
 
 21. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2006). 
 22. JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES 
REGULATION 281 (Wolter Kluwer 6th ed. 2009). 
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persons without registration or exemption.23 
Private equity funds are structured as capital-commitment funds, 
which are also known as drawdown funds.  In other words, capital is 
committed up front and then called down over a period of years (usually 
one to eight) to fund investments, fees, expenses, etc.  This stands in 
contrast with hedge funds, which are structured as “mark to market” 
vehicles that provide investors with redemption rights pursuant to 
periodic (daily, monthly, quarterly) net asset values for the fund.  Private 
equity funds are illiquid: there is no right to redeem, and only a limited 
market for transferring interests.  Investors receive cash flow from 
investments in the private equity funds by way of the distribution 
waterfall.  However, the line between hedge funds and private equity 
funds has become blurrier, as many hedge funds are now creating hybrid 
funds with illiquid side pockets in addition to liquid classes. 
The Investment Company Act of 1940 provides two exemptions to 
the registration requirement under the 1933 Act, namely Sections 3(c)(1) 
and 3(c)(7), which form the basis of the hedge fund industry.24  Section 
3(c)(1) exempts companies with fewer than 100 shareholders.  Section 
3(c)(7) exempts a company that is not making or proposing to make a 
public offering of its securities, and whose shareholders are “qualified 
purchasers” with a high net worth, which generally means individuals 
who own specified investments worth at least $5 million, or institutions 
that invest at least $25 million.25  In the past, one of the more commonly 
used exemptions under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 is the 
“private adviser exemption,” which is available to investment advisers 
with fewer than fifteen clients, among other criteria.26  The Dodd-Frank 
Act27 eliminates the private adviser exemption, which will have the 
 
 23. Id. at 217-19. 
 24. COX, HILLMAN & LANGEVOORT, supra note 22, at 1116. 
 25. Id. 
 26. The private adviser exemption contained in Section 203(b)(3) of the Advisers 
Act exempts from registration an investment adviser that (i) had fewer than fifteen 
clients during the preceding twelve months; (ii) does not hold itself out to the public as 
an investment adviser, and (iii) does not serve as an investment adviser to a registered 
investment company or a business development company.  See SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, 
MEAGHER & FLOM LLP & AFFILIATES, THE DODD-FRANK ACT: COMMENTARY AND 
INSIGHTS 37 (2010); HAL S. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 799 (Foundation Press 
17th ed. 2010). 
 27. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
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effect of requiring a large number of currently unregistered advisers to 
register with the SEC.28  Meanwhile, the Dodd-Frank Act directs the 
SEC to exempt from registration any investment adviser who advises 
only private funds with less than $150 million in assets under 
management in the United States.29 
 
II. FAR EAST OR WILD WEST: U.S. PRIVATE EQUITY FIRMS IN CHINA 
It is impossible to explain private equity-related legal issues in 
China without first painting a picture of the very lively business 
landscape.  This part first presents a short biography of each of the 
leading American private equity firms in China: Bain Capital, 
Blackstone, Carlyle, KKR, TPG, Warburg Pincus, as well as the private 
equity arms of Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, and then 
summarizes some distinctive characteristics of their investment 
activities, laying the groundwork for discussion of legal and regulatory 
issues in later parts of the Note. 
BAIN CAPITAL  
Bain’s offices in Hong Kong and Shanghai are led by industry 
pioneers such as Jonathan Zhu30 and Jingsheng Huang.31  Bain’s 
 
 28. Id. § 403; see also SKADDEN, supra note 26, at 37. 
 29. Dodd-Frank Act § 408; see also SEC Proposes Rules for the Registration of 
Hedge Funds and Other Private Fund Advisers, PRIVATE EQUITY ALERT (Weil Gotshal, 
New York, NY), Nov. 30, 2010, at 2-3. 
 30. Jonathan Zhu is a native of China and served as CEO of Morgan Stanley China 
before joining Bain Capital in 2006.  See Jonathan Zhu, BAIN CAPITAL, 
http://www.baincapital.com/team/TeamMember.aspx?id=102&viewType=ManagingDi
rectors (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).  Calling himself an “accidental banker,” he famously 
decided to go to law school while studying the poetry of Williams Wordsworth in a 
Ph.D. program at Cornell in the late 1980s.  See Michael Schuman, And for This He 
Read Poetry?, TIME, Mar. 21, 2005, available at http://www.time.com/ 
time/magazine/article/0,9171,1039694,00.html. 
 31. Jingsheng Huang received an M.B.A. from Harvard Business School and an 
M.A. from Stanford, and was a managing director of Softbank Asia Infrastructure Fund, 
or SAIF, before joining Bain Capital in 2005.  Huang previously led SAIF’s 
investments in UTStarcom (Nasdaq: UTSI) and Shanda Interactive Entertainment, Ltd. 
(Nasdaq: SNDA).  Huang is an Independent Director of Shanda.  See Jingsheng Huang, 
BAIN CAPITAL, http://www.baincapital.com/team/TeamMember.aspx?id= 
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representative deal in China was a $418 million purchase of a 12.8% 
stake in GOME, China’s leading electronic appliance manufacturer.32  
Bain competed against KKR and Warburg Pincus to win the deal,33 and 
nominated three nonexecutive directors, including Jonathan Zhu, to 
GOME’s board. 
Bain also invested in a series of less high-profile companies, 
including ASIMCO, Casda Biomaterials, GA PACK, Ideal Standard, 
JinSheng International, Sinomedia Holding Limited, SUNAC, and 
Suzhou HiPro Polymers.34 
BLACKSTONE  
Blackstone Greater China maintains offices in Hong Kong, Beijing, 
and Shanghai, led by Antony Leung, former Financial Secretary of Hong 
Kong SAR.35  In May 2007, China Investment Corporation (“CIC”), 
China’s then-fledgling sovereign wealth fund, bought a $3 billion stake 
in Blackstone, which subsequently raised $4.13 billion in its IPO in New 
York in June, the largest stock market listing in the United States since 
2002.  However, the investment proved to be a very poor one and came 
 
83&viewType=ManagingDirectors (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). 
 32. GOME was founded in 1987 by Huang Guangyu (1969- ), a native of South 
China’s Guangdong Province.  Huang was arrested by Chinese police in November 
2008 for alleged economic crimes.  Once China’ richest man (worth $6.3 billion in 
2008), Huang was sentenced to fourteen years in prison and fined 800 million RMB in 
May 2010 by the Beijing Second Intermediate People’s Court.  Huang appealed, but the 
verdict was affirmed by the Beijing High People’s Court in August 2010.  The years of 
wrangling over control of GOME between imprisoned founder Huang Guangyu and his 
successor Chen Xiao ended with Chen’s “honorable departure” on March 9, 2011.  See 
Joe McDonald, Huang Guangyu, Former Richest Man in China, Gets 14 Years in Jail, 
HUFFINGTON POST (May 18, 2010, 5:32 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2010/05/18/huang-guangyu-former-rich_n_579810.html#. 
 33. Jackie Cheung & Rick Carew, Bain Capital, China’s GOME Forge Deal, 
WALL ST. J., June 23, 2009, at B4. 
 34. Investments, BAIN CAPITAL ASIA, http://www.baincapitalasia.com/Investments 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2011). 
 35. See Antony Leung, BLACKSTONE, http://www.blackstone.com/cps/rde/xchg/ 
bxcom/hs/firm_ourpeople_antony_leung.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).  Aside from 
Leung’s official role, his marriage in July 2002 to Fu Mingxia, four-time Olympics 
champion (“Queen of Diving”) and twenty-six years his junior, is a perennial talk of the 
town.  For some background on Antony Leung’s relationship with the PRC 
government, see Mark Landler, A New Aide Prompts Talk of Beijing’s Strength in Hong 
Kong, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2001, at A9. 
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under intense criticism domestically.36 
Blackstone tested the waters in September 2007 by acquiring a 20% 
stake in China National BlueStar, a special chemical maker, from China 
National Chemical Corporation for $600 million.  The transaction was 
approved by the National Development and Reform Commission 
(“NDRC”) about four months later.37 
More recently, in March 2010 Blackstone partnered with a 
consortium to invest $600 million in Dili Group, which owns 
Shouguang Agricultural Product Logistic Park, an agricultural-product 
trading center.38 
CARLYLE  
Among American private equity firms, Carlyle is one of the early 
movers, boasting “ten years of success in China.”39  The confidence is 
well founded; judging from the numbers, Carlyle is indeed the most 
active American private equity firm in China, investing $2.5 billion in 
 
 36. Keith Bradsher, China Faces Backlash at Home over Blackstone Investment, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2007, at C1. 
 37. See China Approves Blackstone Investment in BlueStar, REUTERS (Jan. 10, 
2008, 6:43 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/01/10/us-blackstone-bluestar-
idUSPEK28690120080110.  NDRC is a macroeconomic management agency under 
China’s State Council, which has broad administrative and planning control over the 
Chinese economy.  Shan Fu, Senior Managing Partner in Blackstone’s Beijing office, is 
a former official of the NDRC.  See Shan Fu, BLACKSTONE, 
http://www.blackstone.com/cps/rde/xchg/bxcom/hs/firm_ourpeople_shan_fu.htm (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2011). 
 38. Shouguang, home to about one million people in the coastal province of 
Shandong, is known as China’s “home of vegetables” for its year-round harvests.  See 
Kennix Chim & George Chen, Blackstone in $600 Million China Agricultural Deal, 
REUTERS (Mar. 17, 2010, 9:20 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/03/17/us-
blackstone-china-agricultural-idUSTRE62G24K20100317. 
 39. CARLYLE GROUP, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 10 (2008).  Leaders in Carlyle’s China 
offices include Wayne Tsou and Xiang-Dong Yang, among others.  Tsou earned his 
J.D. from Harvard Law School, an M.B.A. from Harvard Business School and an M.S. 
in electrical engineering from California Institute of Technology, and worked for 
Warburg Pincus from 1998 to 2004.  See Wayne Tsou, CARLYLE GROUP, 
http://www.carlyle.com/Team/item5869.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).  Yang received 
his B.A. in economics from Harvard University and M.B.A. from Harvard Business 
School.  See Xiang-Dong Yang, CARLYLE GROUP, http://www.carlyle.com/team/ 
item5713.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). 
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about fifty deals.40  In April 2010, Carlyle completed raising $2.55 
billion for its third Asia fund, the Carlyle Asia Partners III (CAP III). 
Carlyle earned its glory the hard way.41  Carlyle’s attempted and 
eventually failed bid for Xugong Group, one of China’s largest 
construction machinery manufacturers, was called by the Wall Street 
Journal “a deal that helped define the limitations of what foreign private 
equity investors could do in China.”42  Carlyle signed an ambitious deal 
to purchase an 85% stake in Xugong in October 2005.43  On June 6, 
2006, Xiang Wenbo, a senior executive44 from one of Carlyle’s bidding 
competitors, started a blog to disclose alleged “scandals” in the bidding 
process.  Xiang rose to prominence by evoking nationalistic sentiments45 
and concerns over the country’s national economic security when a large 
chunk of state-owned assets would suddenly change hands to foreign 
investors at a perceived low price.  Two months later, a new and more 
 
 40. CARLYLE GROUP, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 20 (2009).  Carlyle founder David 
Rubenstein reasserted his confidence in the firm’s investments in Asia during an 
interview with Alan Murray, Executive Editor of the Wall Street Journal Online.  See 
Executive Breakfast Series: David M. Rubenstein, WALL ST. J. VIEWPOINTS (Mar. 18, 
2010), http://online.wsj.com/ad/article/viewpoints-rubenstein.html. 
 41. In addition to the Xugong case, Carlyle also suffered setbacks in its attempts to 
invest in Guangdong Development Bank and Chongqing City Commercial Bank, 
among others.  See Pan Hongxiu, Kailei Zixing, Jianghu Yeyu Shinian Deng 
[Reflections of Carlyle: Ten Years in the Game], ZHONGGUO QIYEJIA [CHINA 
ENTREPRENEUR], Apr. 2010, available at http://www.21cbh.com/HTML/2010-4-
2/zNMDAwMDE3MTQzNw.html. 
 42. Dinny McMahon, Carlyle Moves On from Xugong Shadow, WALL ST. J. CHINA 
REAL TIME REPORT (Jan. 12, 2010, 3:56 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/ 
2010/01/12/carlyle-moves-on-from-xugong-shadow/. 
 43. Rick Carew, Will China Buy the World? The Beijing Debate, WALL ST. J. 
CHINA REAL TIME REPORT (Mar. 10, 2009, 5:33 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
chinarealtime/2009/03/10/will-china-buy-the-world-the-beijing-debate/. 
 44. Xiang was Vice Chairman (now President) of Sany Group, founded in 1989 
and based in Changsha, Hunan Province in Central China.  The company is currently 
undergoing rapid global expansion and has business relationships with approximately 
fifty countries.  During a visit in December 2010 by Yang Jiechi, China’s Foreign 
Minister, Xiang Wenbo presented the Foreign Minister with a model of the Sany 
Crawler Crane SCC4000 that was adopted by the Chilean government for the rescue of 
the thirty-three trapped miners.  Press Release, Sany Group, Sany Welcomes Visit by 
Foreign Minister (Jan. 20, 2011), http://www.sanygroup.com/group/en-us/media/ 
24527_for_news_text.htm. 
 45. Carew, supra note 43; Echo Zhou, The Creator of “Created in China,” THE 
LINK (China Europe International Business School, or CEIBS, Shanghai, China), Apr. 
2009, available at http://www.ceibs.edu/link/latest/38900.shtml. 
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restrictive foreign M&A regulation was jointly promulgated by six 
government agencies.46  Carlyle reduced its proposed stake to 45% in 
March 2007, and eventually gave up the proposal in July 2008.47  The 
Xugong case offers fertile ground for studying the administrative 
rulemaking processes in China: namely, how they are affected by social 
pressure in a country where there is no representative democracy in the 
Western sense, and how they are shaped by the coordination and 
conflicts of interest between different government agencies. 
Carlyle enjoyed successes in many other transactions.  In 
November 2000, Carlyle invested $8 million in Ctrip, a leading online 
and offline hotel reservation and travel services provider in China.48  In 
December 2003, Ctrip completed an IPO on Nasdaq (“CTRP”); and in 
2004, Carlyle fully exited its investment in Ctrip.49 
In December 2005, Carlyle signed an agreement with China Pacific 
Insurance Group Co. (CPIC Group) to participate in the injection of 
RMB 6.6 billion new capital into China Pacific Life Insurance Co. 
(CPIC Life), the country’s third largest life insurer.  The Carlyle 
partnership held a 25% stake (RMB 3.3 billion, or $410 million50) in 
CPIC Life after the injection.51  CPIC Life subsequently underwent two 
IPOs, first in Shanghai in December 2007, and then in Hong Kong in 
 
 46. See Foreign M&A Provisions, infra note 173. 
 47. Pan, supra note 41.  Also note that China passed its first Property Law to 
formally protect private property during this period of time, when the ideological debate 
between the old and the new was in high tide.  See Wuquan Fa [Property Law] 
(promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007); 
Joseph Kahn, China Backs Property Law, Buoying Middle Class, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 
2007, at A1. 
 48. See Liu Hongyan, Kailei Zhongguo de Touzi Chuanqi [The Investment Legend 
of Carlyle China], 21 SHIJI JINGJI BAODAO [21 CENTURY BUSINESS HERALD], Jan. 14, 
2006, available at http://www.cye.com.cn/chuangyeketang/caifujinyan/ 
20060114175137.htm. 
 49. Id. 
 50. All currency conversions in this note are based on then-current exchange rate 
between the dollar and the renminbi (yuan).  The exchange rate was largely fixed at 1 
dollar = 8.3 yuan from 1994 to July 21, 2005.  From that day on, the yuan appreciated 
gradually for about 20%.  As of the revising of this note (August 23, 2011), the 
exchange rate is 1 dollar = 6.3976 yuan. 
 51. Prudential Financial (United States) was a strategic investor in this transaction.  
Press Release, Carlyle, China Pacific Insurance (Group) Co. Joins with Carlyle to Inject 
a Total of RMB 6.6 Billion New Capital into China Pacific Life Insurance Co. (Dec. 19, 
2005), http://www.carlyle.com/media%20room/news%20archive/2005/item6743.html. 
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December 2009, raising a total of RMB 30 billion, or $4.1 billion.  In 
late 2010 and early 2011, Carlyle sold half of its stake in CPIC Life for 
approximately $2.67 billion.52 
In addition to CPIC Life, three other Chinese portfolio companies 
of Carlyle – China Forestry, Concord Medical Services and Kaisa Group 
– successfully completed public offerings in Hong Kong and New York 
in 2009, raising a combined total of $3.8 billion.53 
 
Figure 2 
“Carlyle Group - Ten Years of Success in China.” 
 
 
Source: CARLYLE GROUP, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 10 (2008) 
 
 52. Before the sellings occurred on December 30, 2010 and January 10, 2011, 
Carlyle owned 61% of CPIC Life’s H shares (the shares of companies incorporated in 
mainland China that are traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange).  Chen Huiying, 
Kailei Zuobie Zhongguo Taibao, 5 Nian Jingzhuan 50 Yi Meiyuan [Carlyle Bids 
Farewell to CPIC Life, Netting $5 Billion in Five Years], XIN SHI JI [CENTURY 
WEEKLY], Jan. 17, 2011, available at http://news.163.com/11/0118/04/ 
6QLDO5HD00014AED.html. 
 53. CARLYLE GROUP, supra note 40, at 6.  For a full list of Carlyle’s portfolio 
companies in Asia, see Asia Portfolio, CARLYLE, http://www.carlyle.com/Geography/ 
Asia/item8461.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). 
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KOHLBERG KRAVIS ROBERTS (KKR)  
KKR’s China endeavor is led by David Liu54 and backed by KKR 
co-founder Henry Kravis.55  In September 2007, KKR led a consortium 
that invested $450 million (of which KKR contributed $150 million)56 in 
Tianrui Cement, a family enterprise and one of China’s top ten cement 
producers.  Later, KKR reportedly experienced serious trouble in terms 
of corporate governance with Tianrui’s founder, Li Liufa.57 
Then, in June 2009, KKR invested $150 million in Modern Dairy, a 
leading dairy farming company headquartered in Ma Anshan in China’s 
central province of Anhui.58  Modern Dairy is one of the largest 
operators of centralized large-scale dairy farms in China, and with 
KKR’s investment, Modern Dairy targeted to construct another twenty 
to thirty large-scale farms in China as well as to pursue acquisitions.59  
 
 54. David Liu graduated from Columbia University as Class Salutatorian with a 
B.S. in Electrical Engineering.  See David Liu, KKR, http://www.kkr.com/team/ 
theteam.cfm?CategoryName=Investment%20Professionals-Private%20Equity% 
20and%20Asset%20Management&TitleSortOrder=LastName%20Asc&Pagenum=3 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2011). 
 55. Henry Kravis had personally met with Liu Deshu, President of SinoChem, the 
parent company of Fast Eastern Leasing (now renamed Fast East Horizon) to discuss 
KKR’s investment in the latter.  Press Release, SinoChem, Liu Deshu Meets KKR 
Global CEO (Sept. 21, 2010), http://www.sinochem.com/tabid/871/InfoID/11462/ 
frtid/790/Default.aspx.  Kravis also spoke at the annual Global Private Equity Beijing 
Forum on November 10, 2008 (Chinese transcript available at 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/hy/20081110/10555487233.shtml). 
 56. Press Release, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, KKR Leads US$450 Million 
Financing for Tianrui Cement (Sept. 17, 2007), http://www.kkr.com/ 
releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=333004&KeepThis=true&TB_iframe=true&height=461&
width=592  (“Tianrui Cement has also received commitments from the International 
Finance Corporation and an international banking syndicate led by JPMorgan for an 
additional US$335 million of USD and RMB long-term financing.”). 
 57. See Tina Wang, KKR’s Concrete Lessons In China, FORBES, July 9, 2009, 
available at http://www.forbes.com/2009/07/09/kkr-tianrui-cement-china-private-
equity-asia.html (“By April 2008, Li Liufa was seen as running Tianrui Cement like his 
own fiefdom, say industry sources.  A board meeting scheduled for that month in Henan 
was not held because Li did not show up, and this upset the head of KKR’s China team, 
David Haifeng Liu, according to the former executive.”). 
 58. Modern Dairy was founded in 2005 by former managers of Mengniu Dairy, 
China’s largest liquid milk producer.  See Cathy Chan, KKR Said to Pay $150 Million 
for Stake in China’s Modern Dairy, BLOOMBERG (June 15, 2009, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a1hRKK7enOLw. 
 59. Press Release, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, Ma Anshan Modern Farming 
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Modern Dairy had its Hong Kong IPO in late 2010.60 
TPG  
TPG61 has a long track record of investing in China.  In addition to 
the Shenzhen Development Bank transaction mentioned earlier, another 
landmark deal was TPG’s investment (with General Atlantic, another 
leading private equity firm) in Lenovo in 2005.62  The private equity 
firms owned a combined 2.8% stake in Lenovo, began reducing their 
holdings in 2007, and eventually exited in fall 2010.63 
TPG’s investments in China64 also include Yunnan Red Winery 
(March 2007, $14 million),65 China Grand Automotive Services (three 
 
Receives Investment from KKR (June 15, 2009), http://www.kkr.com/ 
releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=389500&KeepThis=true&TB_iframe=true&height=461&
width=592.  One reviewer of this note pointed out that “this is an extremely successful 
investment that distinguishes premier foreign funds from the “eat what’s up to your 
mouth” domestic funds.  When they invested in this company, it was still making a big 
loss and the cash flow was negative.  A domestic private equity fund would hardly take 
such deal.  Obviously, KKR foresaw the bright future of scaled modern farming that 
was beyond the tradition farming skill of China.  And they have the global resources to 
help the company to grow big.”  E-mail from Hogan Chao, China First Capital, to 
Lawrence Zhan Zhang, Fordham Law School (Mar. 27, 2011, 02:56 EST) (on file with 
author). 
 60. See Fox Hu, China Modern Diary May Raise $571 Million in IPO, Terms 
Show, BLOOMBERG, (Nov. 11, 2010, 4:54 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/ 
news/2010-11-11/china-modern-dairy-may-raise-571-million-in-ipo-terms-show.html. 
 61. TPG was founded as Texas Pacific Group in 1992, but later shortened its name 
to TPG.  See Henny Sender, “Sorry, Sir.  Texas Pacific Group Isn’t Here Anymore,” 
WALL ST. J. DEAL J. (Mar. 1, 2007, 11:39 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2007/03/01/ 
sorry-sir-texas-pacific-group-isnt-here-anymore/. 
 62. Press Release, Lenovo, Lenovo Announces US$350 Million Strategic 
Investment from Leading Private Equity Firms (Mar. 31, 2005), 
http://www.lenovo.com/news/us/en/2005/04/investors.html. 
 63. Philip Lagerkranser & Mark Lee, Lenovo Falls after TPG, General Atlantic 
Said to Exit, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 16, 2010, 6:42 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/ 
news/2010-11-16/lenovo-falls-after-tpg-general-atlantic-said-to-exit.html. 
 64. Unlike other private equity firms discussed here, which all disclose their 
portfolio companies, on its website, TPG provides no information other than the contact 
information for its fourteen global offices, adding to the difficulty of research. 
 65. TPG Fund Makes First China Investment: Yunnan Wine, REUTERS (Apr. 11, 
2007, 3:25 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/04/11/tpg-china-
idUSHKG31694620070411.  Yunnan is a province in Southwest China. 
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investments from 2007 to 2010, for undisclosed amounts),66 shoe retailer 
Daphne (May 2009, $80.5 million),67 supermarket chain WuMart 
(August 2009, $120 million),68 and casual sportswear manufacturer 
China Vogue (October 2010, $45 million),69 among others. 
TPG hired Mary Ma, former Chief Financial Officer of Lenovo, to 
head its China operations in September 2007.70  Ma left TPG in early 
2011 to start another fund, joining other mainland executives at Western 
buyout firms who have decided to strike out on their own.71 
WARBURG PINCUS  
Warburg Pincus currently has twenty-one portfolio companies in 
China,72 covering a diverse range of business sectors.  Notable 
 
 66. Bei Hu, TPG-Owned China Grand Auto Said to Plan $1 Billion Initial Public 
Offering, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 15, 2010, 6:03 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
2010-04-15/tpg-owned-china-grand-auto-said-to-plan-1-billion-initial-public-
offering.html. 
 67. TPG Invests In Chinese Shoe Retailer Daphne, REUTERS (May 25, 2009, 11:50 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2009/05/25/afx6462540.html. 
 68. WuMart Sells Stake to TPG, Hony ahead of Possible Listing, CHINA ECONOMIC 
REVIEW, Aug. 14, 2009, available at http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/ 
dailybriefing/2009_08_14/Wumart_sells_stake_to_TPG_Hony_ahead_of_possible_listi
ng.html. 
 69. TPG Invests $45M in China Sportswear Maker, CHINA DAILY, Oct. 19, 2010, 
available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2010-10/19/content_ 
11430382.htm. 
 70. Ma worked for Lenovo for 17 years before joining TPG.  Mark Kleinman, TPG 
Hires Mary Ma for China Push, TELEGRAPH, Sept. 7, 2007, available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/markets/2815270/TPG-hires-Mary-Ma-for-China-
push.html; Carlos Tejada, Business Savvy Propels Ma in China Market, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 13, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123187470105578101.html. 
 71. Henny Sender, TPG’s Ma Joins Exodus of Chinese Talents from Western Buy-
out Firms, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2011, available at http://www.ftchinese.com/story/ 
001036845/en.  One reviewer of this note, an insider of the Chinese private equity 
industry, commented that “I think cultural conflicts and deal execution are the main 
issues.  For instance, I heard that to invest in a hotpot chain, analysts at KKR need to 
produces a 30-page presentation just to explain what is hotpot to people in New York.  
Overnight conference call is regular but discussions are often trivial.  Such low 
efficiency makes it difficult for foreign funds to compete with local ones.  Chinese 
market is rapidly changing, you need to take quick action and lock in as much as 
possible today.”  E-mail from Hogan Chao, China First Capital, to Lawrence Zhan 
Zhang, Fordham Law School (Mar. 27, 2011, 02:56 EST) (on file with author). 
 72. Portfolio Companies by Geography, WARBURG PINCUS, 
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investments include: a 2005 investment in Harbin Pharmaceuticals, a 
leading domestic pharmaceutical company; a 2006 investment in 7 Day 
Inn, founded in Guangzhou, Guangdong Province and one of the leading 
budget hotel chains in China; and a 2006 investment in Greentown 
China, headquartered in Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province and one of the 
leading residential property developers focused on the country’s urban 
middle class. 
 In addition to the six private equity firms discussed above, the 
private equity arms of Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley have also 
been quite active in China. 
GOLDMAN SACHS PRIVATE EQUITY GROUP  
Goldman Sachs bought a 4.9% stake in the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China (“ICBC”) in April 2006 for $2.58 billion, 
ahead of the bank’s Hong Kong IPO on October 10, 2006.  In March 
2009, Goldman Sachs committed to a new lockup in relation to its 
investment in ICBC.73  In early June 2009, Goldman raised $1.9 billion 
by selling almost the entire stake that it was free to divest (20%) under 
the revised lockup agreement with ICBC.74  Then, in September 2010, 
Goldman reduced its stake from 3.9% to 3.1% to raise $2.05 billion.75 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://www.warburgpincus.com/portfolio/PortfolioBySubRegion.aspx (last visited Apr. 
1, 2011). 
 73. Under then existing lockup, the ICBC shares held by Goldman Sachs would 
have become free in equal installments on April 28, 2009 and October 20, 2009.  Under 
the new lockup, Goldman Sachs would not sell 80% of its ICBC shares at any time 
prior to April 28, 2010.  Press Release, Goldman Sachs, ICBC and Goldman Sachs 
Announce New Share Lock-up Commitment and Reaffirm Strategic Cooperation (Mar. 
25, 2009), http://www2.goldmansachs.com/our-firm/press/pressreleases/archived/2009/ 
icbc-gs-commitment.html. 
 74. Bei Hu & Christine Harper, Goldman Sachs Raises $1.91 Billion in ICBC Stock 
Sale, BLOOMBERG (June 2, 2009, 5:24 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a4HY3.3hvmNM&refer=home. 
 75. Nisha Gopalan & Peter Stein, Goldman Cutting Stake in China’s ICBC, WALL. 
ST. J., Sept. 30, 2010, at C2. 
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Figure 3 
Offloading: Goldman Sachs’ buying and selling of ICBC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Nisha Gopalan & Peter Stein, Goldman Cutting Stake in China’s  
        ICBC, WALL. ST. J., Sept. 29, 2010. 
 
Aside from its activities in the banking sector, Goldman led a 
consortium in June 2007 to acquire a majority stake in Shuanghui, a 
leading meat processing company based in Henan Province, Central 
China.76  Like Carlyle, Goldman Sachs has had its own share of bad luck 
navigating China’s regulatory labyrinth.  In November 2006, Goldman 
proposed to buy a 10.71% stake for $96 million in Guangdong Midea, 
an electronic appliance giant, in which both Bain and Warburg Pincus 
have also invested.  In August 2007, the deal was vetoed by the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission on the sole ground that the “price 
was too low,” even though the deal had been approved by the Ministry 
of Commerce two months earlier.77 
 
 76. Goldman has gradually reduced its stake over the years, down to about 10% by 
the end of 2009.  Goldman Sachs HK Unit Ups China Shuanghui Stake 25% to 60.7%, 
MARKETWATCH (June 17, 2007, 10:52 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/ 
goldman-sachs-hk-unit-ups-china-shuanghui-stake-25-to-607. 
 77. See Shu-Ching Jean Chen, Too Good a Deal for Goldman Sachs, FORBES, Aug. 
30, 2007, available at http://www.forbes.com/2007/08/30/goldman-midea-china-
markets-equity-cx_jc_markets2.html.  In the time it took the deal to pass through the 
regulators, Midea’s share price rose more than five times.  The report indicates that 
TPG-Newbridge owns 16.68% of Midea.  Id. 
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MORGAN STANLEY PRIVATE EQUITY ASIA (“MSPEA”)  
MSPEA is one of the leading private equity investors in Asia, 
having invested in the region for over fifteen years.  Half of its twenty-
four portfolio companies are in China, including such household names 
in China as Belle International, Hengan International, Mengniu Diary, 
Nanfu Battery, Paradise Retail, and Ping An Insurance (which acquired 
the entire 17% stake in Shenzhen Development Bank from TPG).78 
 Some noteworthy characteristics emerge from the “biographies” 
presented above.  In the West, private equity firms often engage in 
leveraged buyouts, but they could almost never do so in China.79  A 
typical private equity investment in China is a non-controlling stake of 
15-40% in an operating company, with the money intended as growth 
capital.80  The percentage of shares that a foreign private equity fund can 
acquire in Chinese companies is restricted by Chinese laws and 
regulations.81  As we see from the foregoing discussion, investment 
amounts range from $8 million (investment in Ctrip.com by Carlyle in 
2000) to $600 million (investments in National BlueStar and Shouguang 
Agriculture by Blackstone in 2007 and 2010, respectively), and even 
higher amounts are bound to emerge now that these firms have come 
onshore with their own RMB funds. 
American private equity firms invest in a wide range of industries 
and regions in China.  The top ten industries as ranked by investments 
are biotechnology/healthcare, cleaning technology, mechanical 
engineering, food & drinks, Internet, retail, real estate, agriculture & 
forestry, chemical engineering, and financial services.82  In terms of 
regions, American firms no longer limit themselves to the relatively 
affluent coastal areas, as foreign capital used to do in the early days; 
rather, they have expanded into the vast inland and even western 
frontiers of China. 
Carlyle has closed by far the most deals, followed by Warburg 
Pincus and Bain.  TPG earned itself a big name through high-profile 
 
 78. Private Equity Portfolio, MORGAN STANLEY, http://www.morganstanley.com/ 
institutional/invest_management/private_equity/pe_asia/portfolio.html (last visited Apr. 
1, 2011). 
 79. See Balfour & Ji, supra note 3. 
 80. See Private Equity in China: Barbarians in Love, supra note 3, at 35. 
 81. See, e.g., Foreign Strategic Investment Measures, infra note 171; Foreign M&A 
Provisions, infra note 173. 
 82. ZERO2IPO RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 2, at 18. 
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investments in Lenovo and Shenzhen Development Bank.  Blackstone 
and KKR each closed a small handful of mega-deals.83  Many of these 
firms’ portfolio companies are small and medium-sized private 
companies that are most in need of growth capital. 
 
III. THE WORST OFFENDER OR A STRONG CONTENDER:  
DOMESTIC PLAYERS84 
Thanks to supportive national economic policy, the unprecedented 
speed of global information flow, and their own aptitude, domestic 
Chinese private equity firms have transformed themselves from 
apprentices to equal players with spectacular swiftness. 
China’s first domestic private equity company with an RMB-
denominated fund, Bohai, was founded only on December 30, 2006, 
with main shareholders such as BOC International, Tianjin Teda, 
National Social Security Fund (“NSSF”), and China Development Bank 
(“CDB”).85  Because it had no precedent, the company had to obtain 
special approval from China’s State Council and the National 
Development and Reform Commission.86  Even though the plan to found 
Bohai was approved as early as December 2005, it took the parties a full 
year to sort out the legal structure and relationships of this new entity.87  
Bohai is undeniably a product of experimentation and compromise; it is 
a “hybrid” of corporation and partnership, unlike its American 
counterparts, which are predominantly limited partnerships.88 
This Note also surveys some other major Chinese private equity 
 
 83. This statement does not take into account Blackstone’s RMB Fund, the 
Zhonghua Development Fund (established in August 2009 with the government of 
Shanghai Pudong New Area).  See Zhonghua Development Fund, BLACKSTONE, 
http://www.blackstone.com/cps/rde/xchg/bxcom/hs/businesses_aam_newinitiatives_zho
nghua.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). 
 84. See Yang Wang, Book Note, China Reexamined: The Worst Offender or a 
Strong Contender?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1143 (2008) (reviewing RANDALL 
PEERENBOOM, CHINA MODERNIZES: THREAT TO THE WEST OR MODEL FOR THE REST? 
(Oxford Univ. Press 2007)). 
 85. See Zhao Jianfei, Bohai Jijin: PE Zhongguo Zao [Bohai Fund: PE Made in 
China], CAIJING [CAIJING], Jan. 6, 2007, available at http://magazine.caijing.com.cn/ 
2007-01-06/110066153.html. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
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firms, including CDH, Citic private equity, Hony, Hopu, and New 
Horizon.  Headed by Dr. Shangzhi Wu89, CDH is a spin-off from China 
International Capital Corporation (“CICC”)90 and was incorporated in 
Cayman Islands in May 2002.  CDH has raised capital for four funds, 
enlisting investors such as Stanford Management Company (the 
manager of Stanford University’s endowment), sovereign-wealth fund 
Government of Singapore Investment Corporation, and International 
Finance Corporation, a member of the World Bank Group.91  Thanks to 
its inheritance from CICC, from 2002 to 2005 CDH partnered closely 
with Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs in a series of investments, and 
profited handsomely.92  Under the leadership of Lefei Liu93 and Dr. 
 
 89. Wu received his Ph.D. in mechanical engineering from MIT in 1991, and was a 
senior investment officer at the International Finance Corporation from 1991 to 1993.  
From 1995 to 2002, Wu worked for CICC, serving as the head of the direct investment 
department beginning in 1996.  Wu became a managing director in 1999 and served as 
a member of CICC’s management committee between 2000 and 2002.  See Shangzhi 
Wu, FORBES, http://people.forbes.com/profile/shangzhi-wu/20595 (last visited Apr. 1, 
2011). 
 90. CICC is China’s premier investment bank.  Morgan Stanley and China 
Construction Bank helped form CICC in 1995, but disputes with CICC’s management 
over personnel, corporate culture, and CICC’s dealings with other foreign banks meant 
that Morgan Stanley over time became a passive investor.  After a three-year effort to 
offload its interest in CICC, in December 2010, Morgan Stanley received long-awaited 
approval from the Chinese government to sell its 34.3% stake in CICC, clearing the 
way for the U.S. investment bank to pursue a new securities joint venture in China.  Its 
shares in CICC were sold to KKR, TPG, Government of Singapore Investment 
Corporation, and Great Eastern Holdings Ltd., an insurer controlled by Oversea-
Chinese Banking Corporation.  See Kevin Kingsbury & Joy C. Shaw, Morgan Stanley’s 
Sale of CICC Gets Approval, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 2010, at C2.  CICC is run by Levin 
Zhu, son of former Chinese premier Zhu Rongji.  See Cathy Chan, China Weatherman 
Zhu Loses Grip as Citic Weakens CICC’s Perch, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 25, 2008, 7:39 
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=arQz8cVWo7Xo& 
refer=exclusive; David Barboza, Deal Seen for Stake in China Investment Bank, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 24, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/24/business/ 
global/24yuan.html. 
 91. See CDH Investments, ZERO2IPO, http://www.zero2ipo.com.hk/cvcf/article/ 
sponsors/29865.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). 
 92. Investments with Morgan Stanley included Mengniu Diary, Paradise Retail, 
and Shanshui; investments with Goldman Sachs included Yurun Group, Focus Media, 
and Shuanghui.  See Li Ling, Dinghui Chuangtou cong “Bang Dakuan” dao “Dakuan” 
[CDH: From Gold Digger to Gold], XIN CAIFU [NEW FORTUNE], Aug. 15, 2006, 
available at http://www.p5w.net/newfortune/caiji/200608/t463976.htm. 
 93. See Lefei Liu, CITIC PRIVATE EQUITY, http://www.citicpe.com/liu_le_fei-
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Yibin Wu94, Citic private equity was established in June 2008 with the 
approval of the NDRC.  It is the strategic onshore private equity 
investment platform of Citic Group and Citic Securities, which owns 
71% of Citic private equity.95  Citic private equity currently manages an 
RMB fund, Mianyang Scientific City Fund, which has a size of RMB 9 
billion ($1.37 billion).96  Hony Capital was formerly the investment 
branch of Lenovo Group.  Managed by John Zhao,97 Hony has won 
equity commitments from Goldman Sachs, Temasek Holdings, the 
endowments of Stanford and Notre Dame universities, and has co-
invested with TPG and Legend Holdings in WuMart in August 2009.98  
Hopu Fund was established by Fang Fenglei,99 the former chairman of 
 
eng.php (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).  Liu was the Chief Investment Officer of China Life 
Insurance Company before heading Citic private equity.  He received a bachelor’s 
degree in economics from Renmin University of China, and a masters’ degree from the 
Chinese Academy of Social Science (“CASS”).  His father is Liu Yunshan, a CPC 
(Communist Party of China) Pulitburo member and director of the CPC Central 
Publicity Department, who is seen as a strong contender for the Pulitburo Standing 
Committee in 2012.  See Cheng Li, China’s Midterm Jockeying: Gearing Up for 2012, 
Part 1: Provincial Chiefs, CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR, Feb. 15, 2010, available at 
http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-leadership-monitor/article/5330. 
 94. Wu has a Ph.D. from Harvard, and after heading up Asia-Pacific mergers and 
acquisitions as partner at McKinsey & Company, he went on to lead Lenovo’s 
acquisition of IBM’s PC division and oversee Legend Holdings, Lenovo’s investment 
arm.  See Yibing Wu, CITIC PRIVATE EQUITY, http://www.citicpe.com/wu_yi_bing-
eng.php (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). 
 95. See Duan Xiaoyan, Zhongxin Chanye Jijin: Zuida de Renminbi PE Shi Zenyang 
Liancheng de [Citic Private Equity: How was the Largest Renminbi PE Forged], 21 
SHIJI JINGJI BAODAO [21 CENTURY BUSINESS HERALD], Jan. 29, 2010, available at 
http://www.21cbh.com/HTML/2010-2-1/164536.html.  Citic Group was founded in 
1979 by Rong Yiren (1916-2005) who was seen as the epitome of “red capitalist” in 
China and who would later become China’s Vice President (1993-98).  See David 
Barboza, Rong Yiren, a Chinese Billionaire, Dies at 89, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2005, at 
C14. 
 96. Jamil Anderlini, Local Buy-out Firms Defy U.S. Groups in China, FIN. TIMES, 
Feb. 8, 2010, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/13b1d6b2-14da-11df-8f1d-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1KJkZTZ00. 
 97. Zhao holds an M.B.A. from Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern 
University.  See John Zhao, HONY CAPITAL, http://www.honycapital.com/hony_en/ 
manage/team.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). 
 98. See Hony Capital, CHINAVENTURE, http://i.data.chinaventure.com.cn/i/32/ (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2011). 
 99. Fang is regarded as the man responsible for convincing his former boss and 
mentor Wang Qishan (now China’s Vice Premier, in charge of the economy) to adopt 
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Goldman Sachs’ securities partnership in China, and is advised by Clark 
Randt, former United States Ambassador to China (2001-09) and former 
head of Shearman & Sterling’s Asia practices.100  New Horizon has 
created a $100 million fund in 2005, a $500 million fund in 2007, and a 
third fund in 2010.  Its investors include JPMorgan Chase, Deutsche 
Bank and Temasek Holdings.101 
For years, China’s National Social Security Fund has been the 
largest limited partner in these domestic private equity funds, although 
its prominence may be matched or even surpassed in the future, as China 
relaxed the restrictions in mid-2010 for insurance funds to invest up to 
5% of their asset in private equity.102  The domestic private equity firms’ 
often extremely strong political connections have generated both interest 
and controversy.  On the one hand, the rise of private equity in China is 
an unmistakable response to the failure of state-owned banks in meeting 
the financial needs of small and medium-sized companies in the private 
sector, and support from the state certainly facilitates the acceptance of 
private equity within China’s financial circles.103  On the other hand, a 
number of authors have offered a more sobering assessment that these 
political connections are a reflection of fundamental flaws in China’s 
economic development model, despite its veneer of a market economy 
 
the American investment banking model and establish CICC, a joint venture with 
Morgan Stanley, in 1995.  See Jamil Anderlini & Sundeep Tucker, The Rise of China’s 
Ultimate Dealmaker, FIN. TIMES, May 13, 2009, available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8efd3718-3fe6-11de-9ced-00144feabdc0.html# 
axzz1KJkZTZ00; Cathy Chan, Goldman’s Fang Makes First Private Equity Investment, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 30, 2008, 1:06 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
apps/news?sid=aOF3lVH7WqRE&pid=newsarchive. 
 100. Rick Carew, Former Ambassador Randt Advises on Chinese Private Equity, 
WALL ST. J. CHINA REAL TIME REPORT (Nov. 24, 2009, 7:02 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2009/11/24/former-ambassador-randt-advises-on-
chinese-private-equity/. 
 101. China’s New Horizon Capital Raises 1 Billion Yuan Fund, REUTERS (Jan. 13, 
2009, 5:03 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/01/13/newhorizon-fund-
idUSPEK11978920090113.  One of the founders of New Horizon was Winston Wen, 
son of the Chinese premier Wen Jiabao.  According to an announcement made by New 
Horizon on October 17, 2010, Winston Wen was no longer with the firm. 
 102. See infra Part VI. 
 103. See Rick Carew, China’s ‘Princelings’ and the PE, WALL ST. J. DEAL J. (Feb. 
1, 2010, 12:22 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2010/02/01/chinas-princelings-and-the-
pe/. 
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and breathtaking growth rate in the past decades.104 
 
IV. SYSTEM IN THE MAKING: THE EVOLVING WEB OF LAWS 
The legal system of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) is in 
form much closer to the legal system of continental Europe than to the 
common law, but also contains substantial elements borrowed from the 
former Soviet Union and inherited from traditional Chinese law.105  In 
the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), China was in legal 
shambles and had virtually no contemporary legislation, and had to start 
from scratch.106 
To understand China’s legal system, one must first understand 
China’s political system.  The PRC is in form a unitary, not a federalist 
state, and all power flows from the central government in Beijing; that 
is, local governments have only such power as the central government 
chooses to delegate to them (although in reality, local governments 
enjoy varying degrees of autonomy because of the limits of effective 
supervision).107  The PRC rejects the notion of horizontal separation of 
powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of 
government.  Constitutionally speaking, the National People’s Congress 
(“NPC”), which is the legislature, sits at the apex of China’s political 
power structure.108  The approximately three thousand delegates of the 
NPC, who are elected for five-year terms, convene for merely ten days 
 
 104. See generally Rick Carew, Cadre Capitalism, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2010 
(reviewing RICHARD MCGREGOR, THE PARTY: THE SECRET WORLD OF CHINA’S 
COMMUNIST RULERS (Harper 2010)), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052748703580104575362120444628254.html; Rick Carew, Raising the 
Red Flag on Red Capitalism, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2011 (reviewing CARL E. WALTER & 
FRASER J.T. HOWIE, RED CAPITALISM: THE FRAGILE FINANCIAL FOUNDATION OF 
CHINA’S EXTRAORDINARY RISE (John Wiley & Sons 2011)), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704030704576070981801479062.htm. 
 105. Donald C. Clarke, The Chinese Legal System, GEORGE WASHINGTON 
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW (July 4, 2005), http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb/dclarke/ 
public/ChineseLegalSystem.html. 
 106. Jerome A. Cohen, China’s Reform Era Legal Odyssey, FAR E. ECON. REV., 
Dec. 2008, at 34. 
 107. Peter Howard Corne, Creation and Application of Law in the PRC, 50 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 369, 370 (2002). 
 108. In reality, that position is occupied by the CPC Pulitburo Standing Committee.  
See Clarke, supra note 105. 
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each year, while the NPC Standing Committee (which currently consists 
of 175 members) and its nine specialized committees work full time.109 
The day-to-day work of the government is carried out by the State 
Council under the Premier.110  The State Council is divided into various 
functional ministries and commissions.  This bifurcation between the 
people’s congress and the day-to-day government is then replicated at 
the provincial and municipal levels.111 
The judiciary is not independent and is institutionally weak.112  The 
Chief Justice of the People’s Supreme Court113 is not a member of the 
Politburo; by comparison, the head of the Ministry of Public Security is 
a member.114  Many judges are either young or not well trained, although 
the situation is rapidly changing as new breeds of well-trained law 
graduates replenish the system.115 
Before the Criminal Code was enacted in 1979, the Constitutional 
Law passed in 1954 was the only statute of the People’s Republic of 
China in force for twenty-five years.116  Massive legislation began only 
in the 1980s, and the rule of law has been gradually taking shape since 
then.117 
Thanks to more than thirty years of reform oriented toward a 
market economy, Chinese economic and business laws have undergone 
a thorough transformation, and are more closely in line with norms in 
 
 109. See CECC, Legislative transparency of China’s NPC, CONGRESSIONAL-
EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA, http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/gov/ 
legistransp.php (last visited Apr. 11, 2011). 
 110. See Clarke, supra note 105. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See Cohen, supra note 106, at 36. 
 113. The current Chief Justice Wang Shengjun was born in 1946 and holds a 
bachelor’s degree in history.  He does not have a law degree.  The inadequacy of his 
educational background for the position of a country’s Chief Justice should be viewed 
against the background that most people in his generation were deprived of the 
opportunity of higher education, due to destructive turmoils brought by the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-76).  Justice Wang’s profile is viewable at the official English 
website of the Supreme People’s Court, http://en.chinacourt.org/. 
 114. See Cohen, supra note 106, at 37. 
 115. Id. at 38. 
 116. See Joan Liu, Finding Chinese Law on the Internet, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 
SCHOOL OF LAW, http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/China.htm (last visited Apr. 
11, 2011). 
 117. Id. 
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advanced countries, compared with other branches of law.118  
Nonetheless, a Western-trained lawyer should note that although the 
country has decisively transitioned from a centrally planned economy to 
a market-oriented one, the state maintains a heavy presence in the 
economy, and the interconnection between politics and economics is 
much less subtle than what one would typically find in the West.  There 
is scantly a literal or metaphorical firewall between politics and business 
like the one in the United States: the political and business elites in the 
United States are effectively separated by the 230-mile physical distance 
between Washington and New York, whereas in China, they rub elbows 
in the same town,119 a fact that may be partially responsible for the 
inordinate expansion of Beijing.  The government and the Party 
routinely wage campaigns against corruption,120 which is among the top 
complaints of the Chinese people, only to see the situation getting worse 
and worse.121 
In a simplified version of China’s legislative hierarchy suitable for 
discussion in this Note, Chinese law has three levels.122  On the top are 
“national laws” adopted by the NPC and promulgated by the President.  
On the second level are the “administrative regulations” adopted by the 
State Council.123  On the third level are the “administrative rules” 
 
 118. See Wang & Huang, infra note 127, at 1. 
 119. As an illustration, in 2009, the top six cities as ranked by number of global 500 
companies were Tokyo (51), Paris (27), Beijing (26), New York (18), London (15) and 
Seoul (11).  Global 500 2009: Cities, FORTUNE, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/ 
fortune/global500/2009/cities/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). 
 120. See Dexter Roberts, China’s Ruling Party Vows to Root Out Corruption, BUS. 
WK., Mar. 10, 2011, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/ 
content/11_12/b4220013645558.htm.  A recent high-profile corruption case was the 
downfall of Liu Zhijun, former Minister of Railways, in February 2011.  Liu had been 
overseeing the extraordinary development of high-speed railways in China, which has 
captured global attention.  See Edward Wong, China’s Railway Minister Loses Post in 
Corruption Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2011, at A8. 
 121. See Minxin Pei, Corruption Threatens China’s Future, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT 
FOR INT’L PEACE POLICY BRIEF, No. 55, Oct. 2007, available at 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2007/10/09/corruption-threatens-china-s-future/g4. 
 122. See Legislation Law (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, 
effective July 1, 2000) chs. 2, 3, and 4. 
 123. XIANFA art. 89, § 1 (1982) (amended 1988, 1993, 1999 and 2004) (China) 
(empowering the State Council to “adopt administrative measures, enact administrative 
rules and regulations and issue decisions and orders in accordance with the Constitution 
and the law.”). 
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adopted by the ministries and commissions under the State Council.124  
Then, the same hierarchy is replicated down at the provincial and 
municipal levels, and because of China’s unitary polity, national laws in 
principle trump provincial and local laws when conflict exists.125 
The counsel who advises an American private equity firm doing 
business in China is likely to be concerned about the following laws, 
regulations and rules, all of which were made after 2005 (the dates of 
effectuation are in parentheses): 
 
●National laws (adopted by the NPC and its Standing Committee): 
       ○Company Law (January 1, 2006) 
      ○Securities Law (January 1, 2006) 
      ○Partnership Enterprise Law (June 1, 2007) 
      ○Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (June 1, 2007) 
      ○Anti-Monopoly Law (August 1, 2008) 
●Administrative regulations (adopted by the State Council): 
      ○Foreign Exchange Regulation (August 5, 2008) 
      ○Foreign-Invested Partnership (“FIP”) Regulation (March 1,  
                  2010) 
●Administrative rules (adopted by ministries and commissions  
          under the State Council): 
      ○The “2006 M&A Rules”: 
           ▪Administrative Measures on Strategic Investments in  
                      Listed Companies by Foreign Investors (“Foreign  
                      Strategic Investment Measures”) (January 31, 2006) 
           ▪Administrative Measures on the Takeover of Listed  
                      Companies (September 1, 2006) 
           ▪Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic  
                      Enterprises by Foreign Investors (“Foreign M&A  
                      Provisions”) (September 8, 2006) 
      ○Foreign Investment Industrial Guidance Catalogue  
                  (December 1, 2007) 
 
 124. Id. art. 90 (empowering ministries and commissions under the State Council to 
“issue orders, directives and regulations within the jurisdiction of their respective 
departments and in accordance with the law and the administrative rules and 
regulations, decisions and orders issued by the State Council.”). 
 125. For an interesting (and many see as groundbreaking) case involving a conflict 
between national and provincial laws, see Jim Yardley, A Judge Tests China’s Court, 
Making History, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2005, at A1. 
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COMPANY LAW   
The new Company Law126 represents a complete revision of the old 
Company Law (adopted in 1993): out of 229 articles of the old 
Company Law, 46 were deleted and 137 were amended; in addition, 41 
new articles were added.127  The reform is intended to bring China’s 
Company Law more closely in line with its counterparts in developed 
economies.128 
The reform introduces several important measures to enhance 
managerial accountability, addressing board composition, the role and 
responsibilities of directors, the protection of minority shareholders, and 
shareholder remedies.129  One significant development is the 
introduction of the derivative suit.  The new Company Law sets out the 
circumstances under which the court may allow shareholders to bring 
derivative action130 and the procedures for doing so.131 
Chapter Eleven (Articles 192 to 198) of the new Company Law is 
titled “Branches of Foreign Companies,” which specifies that “[t]he 
branch of a foreign company established within the territory of China 
does not have the status of a legal person.  The foreign company shall 
bear civil liabilities for the business operation of its branches undertaken 
within the territory of China.”132  Direct foreign investment in China 
may be carried out in three forms: a wholly foreign owned enterprise,133 
a contractual joint venture,134 or an equity joint venture.135 
 
 126. Gongsi Fa [Company Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006). 
 127. Baoshu Wang & Hui Huang, China’s New Company Law and Securities Law: 
An Overview and Assessment, 10 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 1, 3-4 (2006). 
 128. Id. at 1. 
 129. Id. at 6-8. 
 130. Company Law art. 150. 
 131. Id. art. 152. 
 132. Id. art. 196. 
 133. Waizi Qiye Fa [Foreign-funded Enterprise Law] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 31, 2000, effective Oct. 31, 2000). 
 134. Zhongwai Hezuo Jingying Qiye Fa [Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Venture 
Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 31, 2000, 
effective Oct. 31, 2000). 
 135. Zhongwai Hezi Jingying Qiye Fa [Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law] 
(promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2001, effective Mar. 15, 2001). 
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SECURITIES LAW   
The new Securities Law,136 adopted at the same NPC session as the 
new Company Law, is significant in several aspects.137  First, the new 
law opens the door for the development of financial derivatives,138 and 
lays the foundation for the establishment of multi-level securities 
markets in China.139  Second, the new law strengthens the regulation of 
the issuing and trading of securities to further promote investor 
protection.140  Third, in order to enhance the efficacy of the regulatory 
regime, the new law gives regulators more powers to perform their 
duties.141 
The new Securities Law increases the role of the exchanges as self-
regulators by giving them the power to list and delist companies and 
temporarily suspend trading securities142 according to China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (“CSRC”) procedures, as well as formally 
defining the exchanges as self-regulatory organizations.143  In 2009, the 
CSRC further solidified such changes in its administrative licensing 
procedural rules.144 
PARTNERSHIP ENTERPRISE LAW   
The amended Partnership Enterprise Law145 is viewed as an 
important step towards a more pro-investment corporate law, because it 
significantly alters existing partnership rules and principles established 
under the original Partnership Law enacted in 1997.146  The new 
Partnership Law made significant changes in several respects: (1) 
 
 136. Zhengquan Fa [Securities Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006). 
 137. Wang & Huang, supra note 127, at 9-10. 
 138. Securities Law art. 42, 142. 
 139. Id. art. 39. 
 140. Id. art. 67, 74, 134. 
 141. Id. art. 180. 
 142. Id. art. 55, 56. 
 143. Id. art. 102. 
 144. See SCOTT, supra note 26, at 1165. 
 145. Hehuo Qiye Fa [Partnership Enterprise Law] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 27, 2006, effective June 1, 2007). 
 146. Recent PRC Partnership Law Amendments: Domestic Changes Significant, 
Little Immediate Impact Seen on Foreign Private Equity Investment, CHINA UPDATE 
(Morrison Foerster, San Francisco, CA), June 2007, at 1. 
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Limited liability partnership (“LLP”): under the old Partnership Law, 
only unlimited liability partnerships were permissible.  The amended 
Partnership Law now permits investors to establish LLPs;147 (2) Legal 
person partners: the old Partnership Law required partners to a 
partnership to be individuals.  The amended Partnership Law allows 
both legal persons and individuals to invest in partnerships;148 (3) 
Bankruptcy: it was previously unclear whether a partnership could be 
forced into bankruptcy under the old Partnership Law.  The amended 
Partnership Law gives creditors of LLPs the option, when the 
partnership is unable to meet its obligations, either to apply to the 
people’s court for bankruptcy liquidation, or to claim directly against the 
general partners;149 (4) Pass-through taxation: the amended Partnership 
Law expressly exempts partnerships from paying income tax, and taxes 
the income to partners on a pass-through basis.150  The adoption of the 
Partnership Law spurred the extraordinary development of China’s 
private equity industry by encouraging more new firms to adopt the 
partnership structure, which is inherently more suitable for private 
equity investments.151 
The amended Partnership Law specifies “The measures for the 
administration on the establishment of partnership enterprises by foreign 
enterprises or individuals shall be formulated by the State Council.”152  
This is essentially a carve-out; the State Council only filled in this gap 
with its own rule three years later.153 
ENTERPRISE BANKRUPTCY LAW   
The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law,154 adopted at the same NPC 
session as the Partnership Enterprise Law, makes China the first Asian 
 
 147. Partnership Enterprise Law art. 2. 
 148. Id. art. 2. 
 149. Id. art. 92. 
 150. Id. art. 6. 
 151. See Joel H. Rothstein, RMB Funds: The Evolving Role of Foreign Investors and 
Fund Managers in China, PH PERSPECTIVES (Paul Hastings, Los Angeles, CA), Jan. 
2010, at 1. 
 152. Partnership Enterprise Law art. 108. 
 153. See FIP Regulation, infra note 167. 
 154. Qiye Pochan Fa [Enterprise Bankruptcy Law] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 27, 2006, effective June 1, 2007). 
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country to adopt an American-style bankruptcy system.155  In contrast to 
the old regime, under which liquidation is the sole bankruptcy 
mechanism, the new law, for the first time, shifts its focus to corporate 
reorganization and introduces many concepts primarily borrowed from 
Chapter Eleven of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.156  The new law also 
entitles foreign owners and creditors for the first time in modern Chinese 
history to assert rights to assets they own in China.157 
ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW   
Adopted after a near thirteen-year drafting process, the Anti-
Monopoly Law158 is China’s first comprehensive antitrust legislation, 
and has been hailed as a milestone in China’s march towards a market 
economy.159  The difficulty in drafting, adjudication and enforcement of 
this law is partly because the ideas behind anti-monopoly are inherently 
at odds with traditional Chinese culture that tends to be more tolerant of 
concentration of power, although this is too simplistic a statement that 
apparently does not do justice to the full complexity of this issue.160 
The foregoing discussion shows that the country’s most basic 
economic laws – Company Law, Securities Law, Partnership Enterprise 
Law, Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, and Anti-Monopoly Law – were not 
enacted until after 2005 (although the old Company Law and Securities 
Law were made in 1993 and 1998, respectively, they were completely 
revised in 2005).  By contrast, in the United States, the Sherman 
Antitrust Act was passed in 1890, and the major securities laws were 
enacted in 1933 and 1934.  The notion of “rule of law” is relatively new 
to the Chinese who have been living in a Confucian, relationship-based 
 
 155. Shu-Ching Jean Chen, China’s Bankruptcy Big Bang, FORBES, June 12, 2007, 
available at http://www.forbes.com/2007/06/12/china-bankruptcy-law-face-markets-
cx_jc_0612autofacescan01.html. 
 156. David Patrick Eich & Chuan Li, Private Equity Investments in China: Impact 
of Recent Legal Reforms, VENTURE CAPITAL REVIEW, Issue 18, Winter 2007, at 35-36. 
 157. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law art. 5. 
 158. Fan Longduan Fa [Anti-Monopoly Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008). 
 159. Wentong Zheng, China’s Anti-Monopoly Law – One Year Down, ANTITRUST 
AND COMPETITION POLICY BLOG (Oct. 6, 2009), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/ 
antitrustprof_blog/2009/10/chinas-antimonopoly-lawone-year-down.html. 
 160. Id. 
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system for two thousand years.161 
FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGULATION  
On August 5, 2008, the State Council adopted the second 
amendment of the Foreign Exchange Regulation.162  The Regulation 
adopts a more balanced control mechanism for both the inflow and the 
outflow of foreign exchanges in China, and tightens supervision of the 
cross-border capital flows.163  The old foreign exchange rules, first 
issued by the State Council in January 1996 and subsequently amended 
in January 1997, laid out the fundamental foreign exchange policy and 
legal framework in China, and specified that the RMB is freely 
convertible for current account transactions, whereas any conversion 
between RMB and foreign currencies for any capital account 
transactions require State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
(“SAFE”) approval or registration.164  Because of the shortage of foreign 
currencies at that time, the old rules maintained a strict control on the 
outflow of foreign currencies but adopted a flexible approach to 
facilitate their inflow.165 
Because of the rapidly growing size of China’s foreign exchange 
reserves, the new rules tighten restrictions on currency inflow and relax 
the approach to outflow, even though the fundamental foreign exchange 
administration framework established by the old rules remains 
unchanged.166 
FOREIGN INVESTED-PARTNERSHIP (“FIP”) REGULATION   
The FIP Regulation167 has been a long time in coming.  Eagerly 
 
 161. KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH 
REFORM 4 (W.W. Norton 2nd ed. 2004). 
 162. Waihui Guanli Tiaoli [Regulation on Foreign Exchange Administration] 
(promulgated by the St. Council, Aug. 5, 2008, effective Aug. 5, 2008) [hereinafter 
Foreign Exchange Regulation]. 
 163. David Dai, China Adopts a More Balanced Foreign Exchange Control, CHINA 
LAW ALERT (MWE China Law Offices, Shanghai, China), Nov. 2008, at 1. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Waiguo Qiye huo Geren zai Zhongguo Jingnei Sheli Hehuo Qiye Guanli Banfa 
[Administrative Measures on the Establishment of Partnership Enterprise by Foreign 
Enterprises or Individuals in China] (promulgated by the St. Council, Nov. 25, 2009, 
872 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
anticipated by foreign investors and attorneys as early as in 2007, it was 
not enacted by the State Council until August 19, 2009, and another 
three months went by before the Premier promulgated the Regulation.  
The FIP Regulation represents an important step toward a national-law 
level framework permitting foreign investors to utilize a PRC 
partnership structure to form onshore RMB private equity funds,168 and 
triggered prompt actions from foreign private equity firms like 
Carlyle.169  Like the Partnership Law that came into effect on June 1, 
2007, the FIP Regulation contains a prominent carve-out: “[i]n the event 
China has other provisions for the establishment of partnership 
enterprises by foreign enterprises or individuals in China with 
investment as the main business, it should be subject to those 
provisions” (emphasis added).170 
THE “2006 M&A RULES”   
The “2006 M&A Rules” refer to three rules: Administrative 
Measures on Strategic Investments in Listed Companies by Foreign 
Investors (“Foreign Strategic Investment Measures”),171 Administrative 
Measures on the Takeover of Listed Companies,172 and Provisions on 
Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors 
 
effective Mar. 1, 2010) [hereinafter FIP Regulation]. 
 168. See Draft Foreign-Invested Partnership Regulation – New Possibilities for 
Global Funds in China?  CHINA MATTERS (Paul Hastings, Los Angeles, CA), Sept. 
2009, at 3. 
 169. See Rick Carew & Dinny McMahon, Carlyle Joins With Beijing to Launch a 
New Fund, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2010, available at http://online.wsj.com/ 
article/SB10001424052748704055104574653132375745034.html?mod=WSJ_Bonds_
RIGHTMoreInMarkets. 
 170. FIP Regulation art. 14.  Private equity firms likely belong to the category of 
enterprises “with investments as the main business.” 
 171. Waiguo Touzizhe dui Shangshi Gongsi Zhanlve Touzi Guanli Banfa 
[Administrative Measures on Strategic Investments in Listed Companies by Foreign 
Investors] (promulgated by the Ministry of Com., the China Sec. Reg. Comm’n, the 
State Admin. of Tax’n, the State Admin. for Indus. & Com., and the State Admin. of 
Foreign Exch., Dec. 31, 2005, effective Jan. 31, 2006) [hereinafter Foreign Strategic 
Investment Measures]. 
 172. Shangshi Gongsi Shougou Guanli Banfa [Administrative Measures on the 
Takeover of Listed Companies] (promulgated by the China Sec. Reg. Comm’n, July 31, 
2006, effective Sept. 1, 2006) (amended Aug. 27, 2008). 
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(“Foreign M&A Provisions,” commonly known as “Circular 10”).173  
Circular 10 arrived at the height of the national debate on Carlyle’s 
planned 85% investment in Xugong Group, a construction machinery 
manufacturer, and it probably caused Carlyle to drop the bid in the 
end.174  To the dismay of China’s small and medium-sized private 
companies that had experienced great difficulty securing loans from 
state-owned banks, Circular 10 also effectively sealed off an important 
overseas funding channel for them,175 the “red chip” model.176 
It is crucial to understand the roles and responsibilities of the key 
government agencies that enact and enforce these rules: the Ministry of 
Commerce (“MOFCOM”) supervises and approves foreign investments; 
the National Development and Reform Commission (“NDRC”) 
approves foreign investment project application; the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (“SASAC”) approves and 
supervises state-owned targets; the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (“CSRC”) approves and supervises listed companies; the 
State Administration for Industry and Commerce (“SAIC”) is 
responsible for registration and administration; the State Administration 
 
 173. Guanyu Waiguo Touzizhe Binggou Jingnei Qiye de Guiding [Provisions on 
Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors] (promulgated 
by the Ministry of Com., the State-owned Assets Supervision & Admin. Comm’n, the 
State Admin. of Tax’n, the State Admin. for Indus. & Com., the China Sec. Reg. 
Comm’n, and the State Admin. of Foreign Exch., Aug. 8, 2006, effective Sept. 8, 2006) 
(amended June 22, 2009) [hereinafter Foreign M&A Provisions]. 
 174. See McMahon, supra note 42. 
 175. See Foreign M&A Provisions, supra note 173, art. 11 (“If any domestic 
company, enterprise or natural person merges its affiliated domestic company in the 
name of a company legally established or controlled by the aforesaid domestic 
company, enterprise or natural person in foreign countries or regions, it shall be subject 
to the approval of the MOFCOM”); art. 40 (“Where a special purpose company is to be 
listed overseas, the listing shall be approved by the securities regulatory authority under 
the State Council”). 
 176. In a typical red chip model, a Chinese private company sets up a Special 
Purpose Vehicle (“SPV”) in a overseas tax haven like the Cayman Islands or the British 
Virgin Islands, receives foreign private equity and/or venture capital investment, 
merges the original company into that SPV and possibly does an IPO in an overseas 
stock exchange.  The very onerous and unpredictable approval procedures imposed by 
Circular 10 made it very difficult for Chinese private company to complete a red chip 
fundraising in subsequent years.  See, e.g., Feng Yuding, Hongchou Shangshi Zai Yu 
Shihaowen Konghuang [The Red Chip Model Meets Circular 10 Scare Again], 
SHANGWU ZHOUKAN [BUSINESS WATCH MAGAZINE], Apr. 25, 2007, available at 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/t/20070425/14593540249.shtml. 
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of Foreign Exchange (“SAFE”) manages and monitors foreign exchange 
transactions; the State Administration of Taxation (“SAT”) oversees tax 
registration and collection; and other industry-specific regulators.177  The 
effectiveness of China’s administrative rulemaking critically depends on 
the coordination among these government agencies, whose interests and 
ideologies could conflict and thwart the policy objectives. 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT INDUSTRIAL GUIDANCE CATALOGUE   
Last but not least is the Foreign Investment Industrial Guidance 
Catalogue, which divides all potential foreign investments into three 
categories: Encouraged, Restricted, and Prohibited (unlisted industry 
sectors are deemed to fall into the Permitted category).178  The 
categorization is meant to fulfill policy objectives such as upgrading 
industrial structure, enhancing resource conservation and environmental 
protection, addressing trade surplus and the rapid increase of foreign 
exchange reserves, balancing regional development, and protecting 
national economic security by applying a “cautiously open” policy to 
foreign investment in certain sectors.179 
 
V. ON THE RISE: THE RMB FUND 
The RMB fund has been hailed as the “next opportunity” by 
international private equity investors desiring to compete in China.180  
With the rise of China-based institutional investors and the massive 
increase in domestic liquidity, international private equity investors are 
finding it increasingly difficult to compete with domestic players for 
 
 177. Alex Yong Hao, Founding Director of the Chinese Business Lawyers 
Association (“CBLA”), lecture at the Inaugural Seminar of CBLA: China M&A, Joint 
Ventures, and Strategic Alliances (June 11, 2009) (on file with author). 
 178. Waishang Touzi Chanye Zhidao Mulu [Foreign Investment Industrial Guidance 
Catalogue] (promulgated by the Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n, and the Ministry of 
Com., Oct. 31, 2007, effective Dec. 1, 2007).  The 2007 edition of the Catalogue 
supersedes previous editions (2004, 2002, 1997, 1995).  Our very own profession, legal 
service, belongs in the “Restricted” category. 
 179. Thomas Y. Man, Yan Zeng & Jing (Jean) Sun, Foreign Investment Industry 
Catalogue: New Revisions & Alignment with National Development Strategy, CHINA 
LAW & PRACTICE, Dec. 2007/Jan. 2008, at 17.  The authors are attorneys at Orrick, 
Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP.  Id. 
 180. Rothstein, supra note 151, at 1. 
2011] THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT FOR 875 
FOREIGN PRIVATE EQUITY FIRMS IN CHINA 
 
deals.  Foreign private equity firms believe that Chinese laws governing 
foreign investment put them at a competitive disadvantage to domestic 
investors with RMB funding sources.181  In recent years, governmental 
regulations have made it increasingly difficult for Chinese companies to 
establish offshore ownership structures.182  Therefore, foreign investors 
have to come onshore and become subject to a complex and burdensome 
foreign investment regulatory regime, under which a foreign investor 
generally must set up a special legal entity, called a foreign-invested 
enterprise (“FIE”).183  Foreign investors view RMB funds as an 
opportunity to avoid the complexities associated with making each 
investment as a FIE, and to tap the ever-growing pool of Chinese 
individual and institutional investors.184 
In August 2009, Blackstone signed an agreement with the 
government of Shanghai Pudong New Area to establish the firm’s first 
regional private equity fund denominated in renminbi, planning to raise 
RMB 5 billion, or $732 million. According to the firm, the Blackstone 
Zhonghua Development Investment Fund “will make priority 
investments in the Shanghai Pudong New Area, a major focal point for 
the Chinese government’s plans to develop a leading international 
finance and shipping center in the region as well as in other regions in 
China.”185  It was reported that China’s National Social Securities Fund 
committed up to 40% of Blackstone’s total target size, or RMB 2 billion 
($293 million).186  If true, this would represent the first investment by 
the NSSF in an RMB-denominated foreign fund, which would be 
subject to special permission from the State Council. 
Pursuant to the effectuation of the FIP Regulation as of March 1, 
 
 181. Id. 
 182. See supra notes 175, 176.  These offshore structures previously provided 
convenient platforms for international private equity investments.  Id. 
 183. Rothstein, supra note 151, at 1. 
 184. Id.  See also China RMB Funds: The Far East is Closer than You Think, 
PILLSBURY CLIENT ALERT (Pillsbury, New York, NY), Mar. 3, 2009, at 1-2. 
 185. Zhonghua Development Fund, supra note 83. 
 186. George Chen & Megan Davies, Blackstone Nails Down Some Commitments to 
China Fund, REUTERS (Feb. 25, 2010, 11:43 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2010/02/26/us-blackstone-china-idUSTRE61P0T220100226.  As discussed earlier, 
NSSF has long been the biggest limited partner in China’s private equity industry, 
having contributed to China’s largest private equity funds such as Bohai, CDH, Citic 
private equity, Hony, among others.  Supra note 85. 
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2010, all new RMB funds will most likely adopt the FIP structure.187  
The Chinese limited partnership form is attractive because it shares a 
number of features with limited partnership vehicles from other 
jurisdictions, such as operational flexibility (including flexibility on the 
timing and amounts of capital contributions and profit allocations) and 
pass-through tax treatment.188  While the establishment of a foreign-
invested enterprise in the form of a wholly foreign-owned enterprise, an 
equity joint venture or a contractual joint venture is subject to prior 
approval from the Ministry of Commerce, the FIP Regulation only 
requires registration with appropriate provincial or local branches of the 
State Administration of Industry and Commerce.189  In January 2010, 
SAIC issued compatible provisions, which went into effect on March 1, 
2010, to further regulate the registration procedures with respect to 
foreign-invested partnerships.190 
The promulgation of the FIP Regulation was an important first step 
in making FIPs a reality, and Carlyle clearly took the message to heart.  
In January 2010, Carlyle partnered with a subsidiary company of the 
Beijing municipal government to raise its first RMB fund, in the amount 
of RMB 5 billion, or $732 million.191  Then, on February 24, 2010, 
 
 187. See FIP Regulation, supra note 167. 
 188. Rothstein, supra note 151, at 2. 
 189. John V. Grobowski & Yiqiang Li, Administrative Measures for the 
Establishment of Partnership Enterprises in China by Foreign Enterprises or 
Individuals, FAEGRE & BENSON CLIENT ALERTS (Faegre & Bensen, Minneapolis, MN), 
Jan. 1, 2010, at 2. 
 190. Waishang Touzi Hehuo Qiye Dengji Guanli Guiding [Administrative 
Provisions on the Registration of Foreign-invested Partnership Enterprises] 
(promulgated by the State Admin. for Indus. & Com., Jan. 29, 2010, effective Mar. 1, 
2010); Guanyu Zuohao “Waiguo Qiye huo Geren zai Zhongguo Jingnei Sheli Hehuo 
Qiye Guanli Banfa” Guanche Shishi Gongzuo de Tongzhi [Notice on Doing a Good Job 
in the Implementation of the Foreign-Invested Partnership Regulation] (issued by the 
State Admin. for Indus. & Com., Feb. 10, 2010).  See also Fang Jian, SAIC Issues Rules 
on the Registration of Foreign-invested Partnerships, LINKLATERS CHINA NEWS 
(Linklaters, London, UK), Feb. 5, 2010; RMB Private Equity Funds in Foreign-Invested 
Partnerships, CHINA MATTERS (Paul Hastings, Los Angeles, CA), Mar. 2010. 
 191. Carew & McMahon, supra note 169.  However, partnering with a government 
entity is not a panacea; recently, Carlyle failed to convince the CBRC in its proposed 
investment in the Beijing Rural Commercial Bank, despite strong support from its 
partner (the subsidiary company of the Beijing municipal government), repeating its 
setback in the Chongqing City Commercial Bank.  See Wu & Hu, supra note 11; Chen, 
supra note 52. 
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Carlyle teamed up with Shanghai conglomerate Fosun Group192 to 
establish a $100 million jointly held private equity fund based in China 
and denominated in renminbi.193  This is reportedly the first business 
license granted to a FIP with primary business in private equity 
investment, after the FIP Regulation took effect. 
In the wake of pioneering moves by Blackstone and Carlyle, TPG 
made even bigger splashes in August 2010, announcing that it was 
partnering with two of China’s largest cities, Shanghai and Chongqing, 
to raise nearly $1.5 billion and create its first two RMB funds.194 
 
VI. NEW OUTLOOK: THE DECADE AHEAD 
2010 was an eventful and exciting year for China’s private equity 
industry, and some industry leaders see it as marking the beginning of a 
new era, the coming of age of the domestic Chinese private equity 
companies.195  Such optimism is well founded, although it must also be 
qualified. 
Several developments on the domestic front are noteworthy: (1) 
ChiNext and exit strategy.  ChiNext, launched in October 2009, is the 
Shenzhen Exchange’s Nasdaq-style second stock exchange.  Because it 
is easier and faster for small and medium-sized private companies to be 
listed on ChiNext, ChiNext has proven to be an important alternative for 
private equity fund exit strategies.196  (2) Insurance funds as the new 
limited partner.  The China Insurance Regulatory Commission issued the 
Interim Measures for Equity Investment with Insurance Funds on 
September 5, 2010, opening the door for Chinese insurance companies 
to invest up to 5% of their total assets in private equity funds.197  (3) 
 
 192. Fosun Group is one of the nation’s largest privately held companies, with more 
than $10 billion in assets.  FOSUN INTERNATIONAL, http://www.fosun.com/en/. 
 193. James T. Areddy & Joy C. Shaw, Carlyle, Fosun Set Global Ambitions for 
Partnership, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 24, 2010, 02:37 PM), 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/carlyle-fosun-set-global-ambitions-2010-02-24. 
 194. David Barboza, TPG to Create Chinese Currency Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 
2010, at B3. 
 195. See Liu, supra note 1. 
 196. Id.  Note that in 2010, 96% (or 160 out of 167 cases) of the private equity exits 
in the Chinese market occurred through IPO.  See ZERO2IPO RESEARCH CENTER, supra 
note 2, at 21. 
 197. Baoxian Zijin Touzi Guquan Zanxing Guanli Banfa [Interim Measures for 
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Fund of Funds (“FoF”).  China’s first RMB Fund of Funds, Guochuang 
FoF, was launched on December 28, 2010.  Guochuang FoF was jointly 
set up by CDB Capital (a subsidiary of China Development Bank) and 
Suzhou Ventures Group.198  The initial size of Guochuang FoF is RMB 
15 billion.  Guochuang FoF consists of Guochuang Kaiyuan, a private 
equity FoF with the initial size of RMB 10 billion, and Guochuang 
Yuanhe, a venture capital FoF with the initial size of RMB 5 billion.199 
A nationwide legal framework for private equity is gradually taking 
shape, and in a series of recent rulemaking such as the FIP Regulation 
and the QFLP Program, the authorities seem to be making a conscious 
effort to level the playing field for foreign and domestic private equity 
firms. 
SUPPORTIVE LAWS AND POLICIES  
After the FIP Regulation came into effect in March 2010, the State 
Council continued the momentum by issuing a slew of opinions and 
decisions that together proved to be a big boon for private equity.200  
From April to October 2010, the State Council issued Several Opinions 
on Better Utilizing Foreign Investment,201 Several Opinions on 
Encouraging and Guiding the Healthy Development of Private 
Investment,202 Opinions on Promoting Enterprise Merger and 
 
Equity Investment with Insurance Funds] (promulgated by the China Ins. Reg. 
Comm’n, July 31, 2010, effective July 31, 2010).  As mentioned in Part III, before this 
new rule the National Social Security Fund has been the biggest limited partner for 
private equity funds in the country. 
 198. Hu Rongping, Guokai Jinrong Dazao 600 Yi Guochuang Mujijin [CDB Capital 
Forges 60 Billion Guochuang FoF], JINGJI GUANCHA BAO [THE ECONOMIC OBSERVER], 
Dec. 29, 2010, available at http://www.eeo.com.cn/finance/banking/2010/12/29/ 
190262.shtml. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See supra notes 122-24 for the administrative legislation power vested in the 
State Council and its ministries and commissions by the Constitution and the 
Legislation Law. 
 201. Guanyu Jinyibu Zuohao Liyong Waizi Gongzuo de Ruogan Yijian [Several 
Opinions on Better Utilizing Foreign Investment] (issued by the St. Council, Apr. 6, 
2010). 
 202. Guanyu Guli he Yindao Minjian Touzi Jiankang Fazhan de Ruogan Yijian 
[Several Opinions on Encouraging and Guiding the Healthy Development of Private 
Investment] (issued by the St. Council, May 7, 2010). 
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Restructuring,203 and Decision on Accelerating the Cultivation and 
Development of Strategic New Industries.204  All these opinions and 
decisions highlighted “private equity” as an important component of 
China’s capital markets and beneficial to the national economy. 
These provisions were implemented in the Notice on the Division 
of Work among Departments, which was issued by the General Office of 
the State Council and further carried out by the ministries, commissions, 
and agencies under the State Council.205  For instance, the Ministry of 
Commerce’s Notice on Decentralizing the Examination and Approval 
Power for Foreign Investment aims to decentralize, simplify and 
streamline the approval procedures for foreign investors.206 
On January 31, 2011, the National Development and Reform 
Commission issued the Notice on Further Regulating the Development 
and Filing of Equity Investment Enterprises in Pilot Areas.207  The 
Notice provides much-needed guidance on the regulation of RMB 
private equity funds, and may mark the beginning of a centrally 
administered regulatory framework for such funds.208  Its three most 
important provisions are: (1) Registration with the NDRC: subject to 
limited exceptions, any equity investment enterprises with registered 
capital of more than RMB 500 million and more than one investor must 
register with the NDRC if formed in a Pilot Area;209 (2) Fundraising: an 
 
 203. Guanyu Cujin Qiye Jianbing Chongzu de Yijian [Opinions on Promoting 
Enterprise Merger and Restructuring] (issued by the St. Council, Aug. 28, 2010). 
 204. Guanyu Jiakuai Peiyu he Fazhan Zhanlvexing Xinxing Chanye de Jueding 
[Decision on Accelerating the Cultivation and Development of Strategic New 
Industries] (issued by the St. Council, Oct. 10, 2010). 
 205. Guanche Luoshi Guowuyuan “Guanyu Jinyibu Zuohao Liyong Waizi Gongzuo 
de Ruogan Yijian” Bumen Fengong Fang’an [Notice on the Division of Work among 
Departments to Implement the “Several Opinions on Better Utilizing Foreign 
Investment”] (issued by Gen. Office of the St. Council, Aug. 18, 2010). 
 206. Guanyu Xiafang Waishang Touzi Shenpi Quanxian Youguan Wenti de 
Tongzhi [Notice on Decentralizing the Examination and Approval Power for Foreign 
Investment] (issued by the Ministry of Com., June 10, 2010). 
 207. Guanyu Jinyibu Guifan Shidian Diqu Guquan Touzi Qiye Fazhan he Bei’an 
Guanli Gongzuo de Tongzhi [Notice on Further Regulating the Development and Filing 
of Equity Investment Enterprises in Pilot Areas] (issued by the Nat’l Dev. & Reform 
Comm’n, Jan. 31, 2011) [hereinafter NDRC Notice on Equity Investment]. 
 208. John R. Fadely, Helen Jiang & Catherine Yang, NDRC Notice Regarding RMB 
Funds Provides Guidance on the Regulation of China’s Domestic Private Equity 
Industry, ASIA ALERT (Weil Gotshal, New York, NY), Mar. 2011. 
 209. The Pilot Areas include Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and 
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equity investment enterprise may raise capital only through a private 
placement to investors that are capable of assessing and bearing the risks 
of an investment in the equity investment enterprise;210 (3) Investment 
restrictions: equity investment enterprises must be established in 
accordance with applicable PRC laws and may invest only in shares and 
equity interests that are not publicly traded.211 
QUALIFIED FOREIGN LIMITED PARTNERS AND  
THE SHANGHAI PILOT PROGRAM  
The QFLP has been long expected, and the announcement came in 
November 2010 that Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin had been granted 
special status to accept QFLP as private equity investors.212 Under the 
QFLP, each of the cities will have its own foreign quota for the amount 
allowed to be converted from foreign to domestic currency for the 
purpose of private equity funds.213  The QFLP allows foreign investors 
to bring in foreign capital to convert into domestic currency, but the 
amount must not be more than 50% of the ultimate size of the fund.214 
The QFLP parallels the QFII (Qualified Foreign Institutional 
Investors)215, a program that was launched in 2002 to allow licensed 
foreign investors to buy and sell A shares in China’s mainland stock 
exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen.  Both QFLP and QFII are avenues 
for foreign investors to participate in the Chinese market, under China’s 
capital control regime.216 
 
Hubei.  See NDRC Notice on Equity Investment, supra note 207, art. 5. 
 210. Id., art. 1. 
 211. Id. 
 212. The Floodgate: Three Cities to Test the QFLP Scheme, ASIA PRIVATE EQUITY 
REV. GREATER CHINA EDITION, Dec. 2010, available at http://www.asiape.com/apergc/ 
apergc_issues/apergc1012.html. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. As of June 2010, 96 foreign entities have been approved as QFIIs.  Sixteen of 
them are from the United States, including Harvard, Yale, Columbia and Stanford 
universities.  See QFII Directory, CHINA SECURITIES REGULATORY COMMISSION, 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/G00306208/201006/t20100610_181348.htm (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2011). 
 216. Liu Xue & Wang He, Shanghai Shuaixian Kaifang Waishang Touzi PE 
Zhengce, Renminbi Zibenxiang Kaifang Zai Maibu [Shanghai Takes the Lead in 
Opening Policies for Foreign Private Equity Investment, Renminbi Capital Account 
Liberalization Makes Another Stride], XINHUA [XINHUA], Jan. 12, 2011. 
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In early January 2011, the Shanghai Municipal Financial Services 
Office,217 Shanghai Municipal Commission of Commerce and the 
Shanghai Municipal Administration for Industry and Commerce jointly 
issued the Implementation Measures on Pilot Program of Foreign-
Invested Equity Investment Enterprises in Shanghai (“Pilot 
Measures”).218  Under the Pilot Program, qualified foreign investors can 
apply to convert foreign currency into renminbi, which they can directly 
invest in private equity funds based in Shanghai.  The program would 
allow the investors to bypass China’s tough restrictions on bringing 
funds into the country for financial investments — limits that are part of 
China’s capital control regime.219 
The governing body of the Pilot Program is the Joint Conference 
for Pilot Program of Equity-Investment Foreign Invested Enterprises 
(“Joint Conference”), which is composed of various working units that 
represent interests of the Shanghai government and the State.220  The 
State Administration of Foreign Exchange has enlisted its Shanghai 
branch, the Shanghai SAFE, to control matters arising from foreign 
exchange issues when the Pilot Measures are implemented.221  SAFE’s 
presence suggests that investments made by funds formed under the 
Pilot Measures may still have to be approved by and reported to 
SAFE.222 
QFLP and the Shanghai Pilot Program are considered major policy 
 
 217. Dr. Fang Xinghai directs the Shanghai Municipal Financial Services Office.  
Fang holds a B.S. in economics (1986) from Tsinghua University, and a Ph.D. in 
economics (1993) from Stanford University.  Fang worked for the World Bank for five 
years, before returning to China to work for the China Construction Bank (1998-2000), 
the Galaxy Securities (2000-01), the Shanghai Stock Exchange (2001-05), and the 
Shanghai Financial Services Office since 2005.  See Fang Xinghai, CHINA VITAE, 
http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Fang_Xinghai (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). 
 218. Guanyu Benshi Kaizhan Waishang Touzi Guquan Touzi Qiye Shidian 
Gongzuo de Shishi Banfa [Implementation Measures on Pilot Program of Foreign-
Invested Equity Investment Enterprises in Shanghai] (promulgated by the Shanghai 
Mun. Fin. Serv. Office, the Shanghai Mun. Comm’n of Com., and the Shanghai Mun. 
Admin. for Ind. & Com., Dec. 24, 2010, effective Jan. 24, 2011) [hereinafter Pilot 
Measures]. 
 219. Dinny McMahon, Shanghai Loosens Rules for Foreigners in Private Equity, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2011, at C2. 
 220. Pilot Measures art. 4. 
 221. Id. 
 222. The Breakthrough, ASIA PRIVATE EQUITY REV. GREATER CHINA EDITION, Feb. 
2011, available at http://www.asiape.com/apergc/apergc_issues/apergc1102.html. 
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breakthroughs because of China’s longstanding capital control, which is 
implemented by the SAFE.  China has long maintained a fully 
convertible current account and a selectively convertible capital account 
that favors liberalizing long-term capital flows while restricting short-
term capital flows.223  For instance, SAFE’s “Circular 142” prohibits the 
conversion of foreign exchange into renminbi for equity investment 
purposes.224  The new measures portend simplification of the process 
and relaxation of certain restrictions, but the actual effect may depend on 
many variables. 
Private equity has undergone significant growth in China in the past 
ten years, and the momentum is likely to continue in the new decade.  A 
nationwide legal framework governing private equity is now on the 
horizon.  The FIP Regulation that came into effect in March 2010 made 
it easier for foreign private equity firms to set up RMB funds and 
directly tap into local resources,225 and the QFLP pilot program in 
Shanghai in January 2011 marks the beginning of a new era in which 
China welcomes foreign investors to enter its vast private equity market 
under established rules.226  These new legal developments will likely 
foster a level playing field for foreign and domestic private equity firms.  
Domestic firms have turned from apprentices into real competitors, 
attracting top talents from foreign firms.227  The game just got more 
interesting. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Observing China’s fledging private equity industry is intellectually 
 
 223. China has been reluctant to make its capital account fully convertible because 
its financial system is still immature.  China’s current account has been fully 
convertible since 1996.  See Foreign Exchange Regulation, supra note 162, art. 5 (“The 
state imposes no restrictions on international payments and transfers of current account 
transactions.”). 
 224. Guanyu Wanshan Waishang Touzi Qiye Waihui Zibenjin Zhifu Jiehui Guanli 
Youguan Yewu Caozuo Wenti de Tongzhi [Notice on Relevant Operational Issues 
Concerning Improving the Administration of the Payment and Settlement of Foreign 
Exchange Capital of Foreign-funded Enterprises] (issued by the State Admin. of 
Foreign Exch., Aug. 29, 2008) art. 3. 
 225. See Rothstein, supra note 151, at 1. 
 226. See The Breakthrough, supra note 222. 
 227. See Sender, supra note 71. 
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stimulating.  Private equity was little known in China merely ten years 
ago, but now it has firmly established itself as part of the country’s 
increasingly multi-layered capital markets.  This study of the brief legal 
and financial history of the Chinese private equity industry has two 
broad implications. 
First, the development of a legal framework for private equity in 
China is closely tied with the country’s economic fundamentals.228  
Private equity boomed because there was a gap to fill in China’s 
financial system, which had long been dominated by the country’s state-
owned banks.  A large number of entrepreneurial, private companies 
with high growth potential flourished in reaction to the country’s 
liberalization policies, but many have experienced great difficulties 
securing funds from state-owned banks.229  Chinese savers, who want 
better returns on their investments, and entrepreneurs, who need capital, 
are keen on bypassing the big banks.  Over time, the government also 
realized the significance of weaning the country’s economy off an 
overdependence on bank lending.230  Private equity came just in time. 
In the future, the prosperity of foreign private equity firms in China 
will continue to hinge on the country’s economic circumstances and 
policies, and in particular, policies regarding the renminbi.  Foreign 
private equity firms will stay competitive in China only if they tap the 
ever-growing pool of wealthy Chinese individuals and institutional 
investors, and achieve flexibility on the timing and amount of capital 
contributions and profit allocation through their own RMB funds.231  
Therefore, foreign private equity firms will benefit from a Chinese 
economic policy that gradually loosens foreign exchange control and in 
the long term makes the country’s capital account fully convertible.  A 
fully convertible capital account is a prerequisite for the renminbi to 
become a global currency, which seems to be China’s long-term goal.232  
 
 228. The legal and economic histories of other countries have shown the same.  In 
the United States, for example, the Securities Act of 1933 came in the aftermath of the 
stock market crash of 1929 and during the ensuing Great Depression, and Regulation D 
(discussed in Part I) was a response to conditions of the 1970s that made it 
unnecessarily difficult for small businesses to raise capital.  See COX, HILLMAN & 
LANGEVOORT, supra note 22, at 281. 
 229. See Private Equity in China: Barbarians in Love, supra note 3. 
 230. See McMahon, supra note 219, at C2. 
 231. See Rothstein, supra note 151, at 2. 
 232. See Lingling Wei, New Move to Make Yuan a Global Currency, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 12, 2011, at A1 (quoting remarks from Li Xiaojing, general manager of Bank of 
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Then again, only a global currency is compatible with the “going-out” 
plan now championed by leading Chinese enterprises, state-owned or 
privately-held.  This was clearly in the mind of China’s central 
bankers233 when the bank issued its very first Public Notice of 2011 to 
promulgate the Administrative Measures for the Pilot RMB Settlement 
of Outward Direct Investment.234  Around the same time, Bank of 
China’s New York branch launched renminbi trading in the United 
States for the first time, expanding the nascent offshore renminbi market 
that began last year in Hong Kong.235  Commentators see these as solid 
steps toward a more convertible Chinese currency.236 
Second, private equity offers a unique lens for understanding 
China’s legal system.  As this Note examines, administrative legislation 
and rulemaking237 have played a pivotal role in the development of 
China’s private equity industry, and more recently, in leveling the 
playing field for foreign and domestic private equity firms.  The 
effective rulemaking by the State Council and its ministries and 
commissions is a key source of strength at the current stage of China’s 
economic development.  In fact, it is tempting to think that this system 
 
China’s New York branch that “we’re preparing for the day when renminbi becomes 
fully convertible.”); David Barboza, In China, Tentative Steps Toward Global 
Currency, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2011, at B1 (quoting remarks from Robert A. Mundell, 
a Nobel laureate economist, that “the renminbi was already a regional currency in 
Southeast Asia, where China had become the dominant trading partner of many 
countries.”). 
 233. Some officials at the People’s Bank of China have substantial overseas 
experiences.  Yi Gang, Deputy Governor of the PBOC, received his Ph.D. in economics 
from the University of Illinois in 1986, and became a tenured Associate Professor at 
Indiana University in 1992.  Yi returned to teach at Peking University in 1994, joined 
the PBOC in 1997 and rose through the ranks at the central bank.  He had been in 
charge of China’s monetary policy and foreign exchange administration.  See Yi Gang, 
PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/english/1011/index.html (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2011).  A younger official, Li Bo, now head of the PBOC’s Monetary 
Policy Department II (overseeing the globalization of renminbi), graduated from 
Renmin University of China, received his Ph.D. in economics from Stanford and J.D. 
from Harvard Law School, and has worked at Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP. 
 234. Jingwai Zhijie Touzi Renminbi Jiesuan Shidian Guanli Banfa [Administrative 
Measures for the Pilot RMB Settlement of Outward Direct Investment] (promulgated by 
the People’s Bank of China, Jan. 6, 2011, effective Jan. 6, 2011). 
 235. Wei, supra note 232, at A1. 
 236. See, e.g., Barboza, supra note 232, at B1. 
 237. Such powers are granted by the Constitution to the State Council and its 
ministries and commissions.  See supra notes 123 and 124. 
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possesses some of the advantages typically associated with the common 
law system – flexibility and nimbleness – only that those who assigned 
such attributes to the system are not the judges, but government 
officials.  The officials who made and implemented the recent private 
equity-friendly rules have been credited with their responsiveness and 
adeptness at fine-tuning, or, in the words of the late Deng Xiaoping 
(1904 - 1997), “crossing the river by feeling the stones.”238 
The administrative rulemaking system is at its best when the 
ministries and commissions under the State Council coordinate with 
each other to carry out stated policy objectives.  Conversely, in cases 
where lack of communication, or worse, conflicts of interest arise among 
various agencies, a confusing patchwork of laws and regulations 
ensues.239  Because of the experimental nature of China’s economic 
reform, such inefficiencies are not at all uncommon.  Inter-agency 
conflicts of interest run the gamut from mostly monetary to largely 
ideological.  For example, as the 2006 M&A Rules240 demonstrate, the 
struggle between economic liberalism and protectionism has been a 
perennial hot button, and constantly redefines the boundaries of what 
foreign private equity firms (as well as other financial institutions) can 
and cannot do in China.241 
Looking beyond administrative legislation and rulemaking, we 
encounter a more fundamental question of the Chinese legal system.  
Like other East Asian countries during their economic takeoffs, the 
Chinese system vests enormous discretion in the administrative agencies 
that make and implement the regulatory schemes.242  Unlike Japan, 
which adopted a democratic polity after Word War II, or South Korea, 
which transformed itself into a democracy in late 1980s, the inherent 
lack of checks and balances in China’s current political system continues 
to breed abuse of power and other “systemic risk,” to borrow the term 
from finance.243 
 
 238. See, e.g., Cong “Mozhe Shitou Guohe” Dao Gaige “Dingceng Sheji” [From 
“Crossing the River by Feeling the Stones” to Reforming “Top-Floor Design”], DIYI 
CAIJING RIBAO [CHINA BUSINESS NETWORK], Mar. 9, 2011, available at 
http://money.163.com/11/0309/06/6UMDKE4T00252G50.html. 
 239. See Corne, supra note 107, at 370. 
 240. See supra notes 171 to 173. 
 241. See McMahon, supra note 42. 
 242. John Ohnesorge, Chinese Administrative Law in the Northeast Asia Mirror, 16 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS, 103, 111 (2006). 
 243. See Pei, supra note 121, at 5-6. 
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As discussed in Part IV, the polity of the People’s Republic of 
China rejects the notion of horizontal separation of powers between the 
executive, legislative and judicial branches of the government.244  
China’s legislature, the National People’s Congress, only makes the 
country’s basic laws.245  Even the country’s most basic economic laws 
have not been enacted until very recently, and “rule of law” in the 
Western sense is a new notion to the Chinese who have been living in a 
Confucian, relationship-based system for two thousand years.246  
Although the Chinese Constitution also confers supervisory power to the 
People’s Congress,247 in reality, the institutional infrastructure 
supporting the exercise of such power is very limited.248  For one thing, 
the NPC is not a professionalized representative body, and its three 
thousand or so delegates only convene for ten days each year. 
The Chinese judiciary is not independent and is institutionally 
weak.249  Under current circumstances, it is unrealistic to expect the 
Chinese judiciary to play the kind of role as their U.S. counterparts and 
move the society forward with landmark decisions, although some 
scholars, drawing lessons from the Japanese courts, have advocated for 
the Chinese courts to play a more openly political role in major social 
conflicts.250 
Many scholars see a political system lacking checks and balances as 
responsible for some of China’s most troubling problems, such as 
widespread government corruption, and the ever-widening income 
disparity among different social and political groups.251  Recently, 
private equity has been under intense criticism for being a tool of 
enriching the country’s political establishment, so much so that people 
 
 244. See Clarke, supra note 105. 
 245. XIANFA art. 62 § 3 (1982) (amended Apr. 12, 1988, Mar. 29, 1993, Mar. 15, 
1999, Mar. 14, 2004) (China). 
 246. See LIEBERTHAL, supra note 161, at 4. 
 247. PRC STATE COUNCIL, WHITE PAPER: BUILDING OF POLITICAL DEMOCRACY IN 
CHINA (2005), Ch. 3, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-10/19/ 
content_3645750.htm. 
 248. For an interesting discussion, see Guobin Zhu, Constitutional Review in China: 
An Unaccomplished Project or a Mirage? 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 625 (2010) (arguing 
that the Chinese “constitutional review” system vests the reviewing power in the 
legislature instead of courts). 
 249. See Cohen, supra note 106, at 36. 
 250. See Frank K. Upham, Reflections on the Rule of Law in China, 6 NAT’L 
TAIWAN U. L. Rev. (forthcoming Sept. 2011). 
 251. See Pei, supra note 121, at 5. 
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now joke that “PE” stands for “princes’ enterprise.”252  This new 
development is worrying because it breeds injustice, inequality and 
social instability,253 and undermines the foundation of a “neutral 
government” that some argue has been at the helm of China’s reform in 
the past three decades.254 
How the Chinese legal system may evolve is obviously beyond the 
scope of this Note.  However, private equity provides a captivating lens 
for making fresh discoveries about contemporary China.  Along with the 
whole set of presumptions of the market economy (e.g., equal 
participation, transparency, rule of law) that it is embedded in, private 
equity is becoming a new force in shaping China’s economic, legal and 
political future. 
 
 252. See Carew, supra note 103. 
 253. See, e.g., Carl F. Minzner, Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal 
Institutions, 42 STAN. J. INT’L L. 103 (2006); Katherine Wilhelm, Rethinking Property 
Rights in Urban China, 9 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 227 (2004). 
 254. See Yang Yao, The End of the Beijing Consensus, FOREIGN AFF., Feb. 2, 2010, 
at 1, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65947/the-end-of-the-beijing-
consensus.  Professor Yao is Deputy Dean of the National School of Development and 
Director of the China Center for Economic Research at Peking University.  According 
to Professor Yao, “China has for three decades been ruled by a disinterested 
government – a detached, unbiased regime that takes a neutral stance when conflicts of 
interest arise among different social and political groups.  This does not mean that 
Beijing has been devoid of self-interest.  On the contrary, the state is often predatory 
toward citizens, but its predation is ‘identity-blind’ in the sense that Beijing does not 
generally care about the social and political status of its chosen prey – unlike many 
governments elsewhere that act to protect and enrich specific social or political groups.  
As a consequence, the Chinese government has been more likely than other 
authoritarian regimes to adopt growth-enhancing policies.” (emphasis added).  Id. 
888 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
APPENDIX: ACRONYMS FOR CHINESE PROPER NAMES 
Because the literal translations of China-related entity names tend 
to be long, they are often shortened to their acronyms.  Over time, these 
acronyms entered the lexicon of English-speaking financial 
professionals, lawyers and academics alike.  Many of these acronyms 
became an integral part of these entities’ logos, and are used far more 
often than the original translations (just like the way American private 
equity firm TPG changed its official name from the original “Texas 
Pacific Group” to a nondescript, non-geographic, TPG in 2003).  Listed 
below are the names that have appeared in the Note. 
 
GOVERNMENT ENTITIES 
● People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
● National People’s Congress (NPC) 
● Communist Party of China (CPC), or Chinese Communist Party  
           (CCP) 
● National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 
● State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission  
           (SASAC) 
● People’s Bank of China (PBOC, sometimes PBoC) 
● State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) 
● China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
● China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) 
● China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) 
● Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) 
● State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) 
      ○Administration for Industry and Commerce (AIC) at  
                  provincial and local levels 
● State Administration of Taxation (SAT) 
● National Social Security Fund (NSSF) 
 
COMPANIES 
● Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) 
● Bank of China (BOC) 
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● China Construction Bank (CCB) 
● Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) 
● China Development Bank (CDB) 
● China Investment Corporation (CIC) 
● China International Capital Corporation (CICC) 
● China International Trust and Investment Company (CITIC) 
● China Pacific Insurance Company (CPIC) 
● Shenzhen Development Bank (SDB) 
 
OTHERS 
● State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) 
● State-Owned Banks (SOB) 
● Foreign Invested Enterprise (FIE) 
● Foreign Invested Partnership (FIP) 
● Qualified Foreign Limited Partners (QFLP) 
● Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) 
 
